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## THE OCCASION OF AN ESSAY OF DRAMATIC POESY

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D. JOHNSON introduced the invidious distinction between the general and the occasional in Dryden's criticism, declaring in the *Lives* that his occasional positions are sometimes interested, negligent, or capricious—inconstant to his general precepts. In a less pejorative sense *An essay of dramatic poesy* illustrates the occasional as well as the general, but it is unique in Dryden's criticism because it was published without any visible means of support, not as a pendant to another work. Some writers, mistaking the personal apology in the *Defence of an Essay*—which, as a matter of fact, is incident only to the argument about rhyme—have overplayed the occasional bias of the *Essay* with respect to Sir Robert Howard. But one provocation to the *Essay*, to which an unidentified allusion directs us, has been unaccountably neglected. This motivation helps to explain the *Essay*, and even its concern with dramatic principles, without challenging its conformity to its own laws.

When Dryden wrote the *Essay*, the French and English had already clashed in a notable exchange of opinion. The occasion actually led to diplomatic action and the banishment of the offender. The occasion especially concerned the Royal Society<sup>1</sup> and so provided another reason

why Dryden might not be insensitive to the controversy. It is hardly necessary to remark that complimentary allusions to science are a conspicuous feature of the *Essay*, which was probably written before he was dropped by the Society.<sup>2</sup> But it does seem necessary to remark that dramatic poetry had been an issue in this clash. The famous exchange, in which the Royal Society was directly involved, had for its principals Samuel Sorbière and Thomas Sprat, and produced works which long kept a certain notoriety in England. It is, therefore, all the more strange that they have never entered the discussion of circumstances incident to the *Essay of dramatic poesy*.

In the same year that Dryden published *The rival ladies*, with its prefatory defense of rhyme in serious plays, Samuel Sorbière published his *Voyage to England*<sup>3</sup> and raised a storm of indignation, which was embarrassing to the Royal Society because he had been "admitted a member." Thomas Sprat, the official spokesman for the Society, laid down his *History*

<sup>1</sup> Smith College studies in modern languages, Vol. XI, No. 4 [Northampton, 1930].

<sup>2</sup> These allusions seem less random—aside from their place in the argument—when we recall his "Apostrophe to the Royal Society" in the *Annus mirabilis* (1667).

<sup>3</sup> Relation d'un voyage en Angleterre où sont touchées plusieurs choses qui regardent l'état des sciences, et de la religion, et autres matières curieuses (Paris, 1664).

<sup>1</sup> See Vincent Guilloton, *Autour de la Relation du voyage de Samuel Sorbière en Angleterre, 1663-1664*

MODERN PHILOLOGY, August, 1946

long enough to write *Observations on Monsieur Sorbier's Voyage into England*,<sup>4</sup> which appeared in 1665. In the same year Sir Robert Howard published his *Four new plays*, with the preface now remembered chiefly for having started the controversy with Dryden. Meanwhile the Great Plague had broken out, to be followed by the Great Fire in 1666; together they closed the theaters and hindered publication for eighteen months. For these two years Dryden has nothing to show in the way of publication except his collaboration with Howard on *The Indian queen*, published in *Four new plays*. But it was in this interval, by his own account, that he wrote *Annus mirabilis* and the *Essay of dramatic poesy*, the first of which certainly appeared in 1667,<sup>5</sup> along with Sprat's *History of the Royal Society*. How Sorbière and Sprat are related to the quarrel about dramatic poetry may now be examined.

In criticizing English drama Sorbière raised issues which remained central to the controversy represented by the *Essay of dramatic poesy*. His chief remarks are as follows:<sup>6</sup>

But the Players [Plays] here woud be of little Esteem in France, so far short the *English* come of the *French* this Way: The Poets

<sup>4</sup> Its apparently official character, though not official in fact, is stressed on the title-page: "Written to Dr. Wren, Professor of Astronomy in Oxford. By Thomas Sprat, Fellow of the Royal Society. London, Printed for John Martyn and James Allestry, Printers to the Royal Society." His third paragraph explains his reply: "For having now under my Hands the History of the Royal Society, it will be in vain for me to try to represent its Design to be Advantageous to the Glory of England, if my Countrymen shall know that one who calls himself a Member of that Assembly has escaped unanswered in the public Disgraces which he has cast on our whole Nation" (cf. Evelyn's letter to Sprat, October 31, 1664).

<sup>5</sup> Malone believed that the *Essay* was published at the end of 1667 (cf. *Prose works of Dryden*, I, Part I, 58).

<sup>6</sup> For convenience Sorbière and Sprat are quoted from *A voyage to England ... by Mons. Sorbier. As also Observations on the same voyage, by Dr. Thomas Sprat* (London, 1709); cited hereafter as "*Voyage*."

laugh at the Uniformity of the Place, and the Rules of Times: Their Plays contain the Actions of Five and Twenty Years, and after that in the First Act they represent the marriage of a Prince; they bring in his Son Fighting in the Second, and having Travelled over many Countries: But above all things they set up for the Passions, Vertues and Vices of Mankind admirably well; and indeed do not fall much short in the performance. In representing a Miser, they make him guilty of all the basest Actions that have been practised in several Ages, upon divers Occasions and indifferent Professions: They do not matter tho' it be a Hodch Potch, for they say, they mind only the Parts as they come on one after another, and have no regard to the whole Composition. I understand that all the *English* Eloquence consists in nothing but meer Pedantry, and that their Sermons from the Pulpit, and their pleadings at the Bar, are much of the same Stamp. . . . Their Comedies are a kind of Blank Verse, and suit an Ordinary Language better than our Meetre, and make some Melody: They cannot but conceive it to be a troublesome thing to have the Ear continually tickled with the same Cadence; and they say, that to hear Heroick Verses spoken for Two or Three Hours together, and to recoil back from one to the other, is a Method of Expression that is not so natural and diverting: In short, it looks as if the *English* would by no means fall in with the Practices and manner of Representation in other Languages; and the Italian Opera's appear more extravagant, and much more disliked by them than ours. But we are not here to enter upon a Dispute about the different Tastes of Men, it's best to leave every one to abound in his own Sence.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Voyage*, pp. 69-71. Compare Sorbière's French for the exact turn of his remarks, once seriously misrepresented by the English:

"Mais les Comedies n'auroient pas en France toute l'approbation qu'elles ont en Angleterre. Les Poëtes se moquent de l'uniformité du lieu, & de la règle des vingt-quatre heures. Ils font des comedies de vingt-cinq ans, & apres avoir représenté au premier acte le mariage d'un Prince, ils représentent toute d'une suite les belles Actions de son fils, & luy font voir bien du pays. Il se picquent sur tout de faire d'excellens characters des passions, des vices, & des vertus; Et en cela ils réussissent assez bien. Pour dépeindre

The issues raised here concern the rejection of the unities and decorum as well as the use of rhyme. Rhyme is rejected by the English because it is neither natural nor pleasing. The English (although the translated remark about opera misses the point) are open to attack because they are nonconformists to European dramatic standards—a ground of attack calculated to annoy the court of Charles II.

As one who had made a reputation out of English writers, Sorbière was especially offensive to Sprat, who would not have erred as a modern writer has erred, by praising Sorbière for ideas which he probably derived from Hobbes.<sup>8</sup> Hence Sprat takes advantage of any disparagement of English literature on the part of Sorbière. On the violation of the unities by the English, Sprat replies by contrasting, in too round figures, the present and the past age:

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un avare, ils en font faire à un hōme toutes les plus basses actions qui se pratiquent en divers ages, en diverses rencontres, & en diverses professions; Et il ne leur importe que ce soit un pot pourry; parce qu'ils n'en regardent, disent-ils, qu'une partie apres l'autre, sans se soucier du total.

"L'entends que toute l'Eloquence Angloise est conduite de cette maniere; & que dans la Chaire, & au Barreau, on ne parle pas d'autre façons....

"Les Comedies sont en prose mesurée, qui a plus de rapport au langage ordinaire que nos vers, & qui rend quelque mélodie. Ils ne peuvent s'imaginer que ce ne soit une chose importune d'avoir continuellement l'oreille frappée de la même cadence; ils disent, que l'entendre parler deux ou trois heures en vers Alexandrins, & voir sauter de cesure en cesure; est une manière de s'exprimer moins naturelle, & moins divertissante. En effet il semble qu'elle s'éloigne autant de ce qui se pratique dans le monde, & par conséquent de ce que l'on veut représenter; que la manière Italienne de reciter les Comedies en musique, s'esgare & extravague au delà de la nostre. Mais il ne faut pas disputer des gouts, & il vaut mieux laisser chacun abonder en son sens" (*Relation* [Cologne, 1669], pp. 129-32).

If Sorbière means comedies rather than plays in general, Sprat ignores the distinction.

<sup>8</sup> See Alan M. Boase, *The fortunes of Montaigne* (London, 1935), pp. 254-55; and compare Hobbes's *Answer to Davenant* on poetry and his *Human nature* or *Leviathan* on language. If this matter was not available to Sorbière in Latin, still the parallel is unmistakable; the ideas were no accident in Hobbes.

'Tis true, about an Hundred Years ago the English Poets were not very exact in such Decencies; but no more then were the Dramatists of any other Countries. The English themselves did laugh away such Absurdities as soon as any; and for these last Fifty Years our Stage has been as regular in those Circumstances as the best in Europe.<sup>9</sup>

This contrast, properly dated, appears again in Dryden's *Essay*, together with some concern for European standards.<sup>10</sup> But Sprat, as we shall see, also liberalizes his terms of conformity.

The issue of decorum leads Sprat into a comparison of French and English dramatic poetry, in which he discusses rhymed verse:

He next blames the Meanness of [the] *Humours which we represent*. And here, because he has thrust this Occasion upon me, I will venture to make a short Comparison between the French Dramatical Poetry and ours. .... I will therefore make no Scruple to maintain that the English Plays ought to be preferr'd before the French: And to prove this I will not insist on an Argument which is plain to any Observer, that the greatest Part of their most Excellent Pieces has [have] been taken from the *Spaniard*; whereas the English have for the most part trodden in New Ways of Invention. From hence I will not draw much Advantage, tho' it may serve to balance that which he afterwards says of our Books, that *they are generally stolen out of other Authors*; but I will fetch the Grounds of my Perswasion from the very Nature and Use of the Stage itself. It is beyond all Dispute, that the true intention of such Representations is to give to mankind a Picture of themselves, and thereby to make Virtue belov'd, Vice abhor'd, and the little Irregularities of Mens Tempers, called Humours, expos'd to laughter. The Two First of these are the proper Subjects of Tragedy, and Trage-Comedy. And in these I will first try to shew why our Way ought to

<sup>9</sup> *Voyage*, p. 166.

<sup>10</sup> In the Dedication of *The rival ladies* Dryden is worried lest the English seem eccentric by refusing rhyme in drama.

be preferr'd before theirs. The *French* for the most part take only One or Two Great Men, and chiefly insist on some one Remarkable Accident of their Story; to this End they admit no more Persons than will [barely] serve to adorn that: And they manage all in Rhime, with long Speeches, almost in the Way of Dialogues, in making high Idea's of Honour, and in speaking Noble things. The *English* on the other side make their chief Plot to consist of a greater variety of Actions; and besides the main Design, add many other little Contrivances. By this Means their Scenes are shorter, their Stage fuller, many more Persons of different Humours are introduce'd. And in carrying on of this they generally do only confine themselves to Blank Verse. This is the Difference, and hence the *English* have these Advantages. By the Liberty of Prose they render their Speech and Pronunciation more Natural, and are never put to make a Contention between the Rhime and the Sence. By their Underplots they often change the Minds of their Spectators: Which is a mighty Benefit, seeing one of the greatest Arts of Wit and Perswasion is the right ordering of Digressions. By their full Stage they prevent Mens being continually tir'd with the same Objects: And so they make the Doctrine of the Scene to be more lively and diverting than the Precepts of Philosophers, or the grave Delight of Heroick Poetry; which the *French* Tragedies do resemble. Nor is it sufficient to object against this, that it is undecent to thrust in Men of mean Condition amongst the Actions of Princes. For why should that misbecome the Stage, which is always found to be acted on the true Theatre of the World? There being no Court which only consists of Kings, and Queens, and Counsellors of State. Upon these Accounts, Sir, in my weak Judgment, the *French Drama* ought to give place to the *English* in the Tragical and Lofty Part of it.<sup>11</sup>

Sprat concludes his comparison with an easy victory in comedy, treating Sorbière to a lesson in humors which he might have learned for himself:

<sup>11</sup> *Voyage*, pp. 167-69. The chief variants of the 1665 text are supplied in brackets, except for the spelling of "rhime" as "rhythm."

And now having obtained this, I suppose they will of their own Accord resign the other Excellence, and confess that we have far exceeded them in the Representation of the different Humours. The Truth is, the *French* have always seemed almost ashame'd of the true Comedy; making it not much more than the Subject of their *Farcés*: Whereas the *English* Stage has so much abounded with it, that perhaps there is scarce any Sort of Extravagance of which the Minds of Men are capable but they have in some measure express'd. It is in Comedies, and not in Solemn Histories, that the *English* use to relate the Speeches of Waggoners, of Fencers, and of Common Soldiers. And this I dare assure *Monsieur de Sorbiere*, that if he had understood our Language, he might have seen himself in all [his] Shapes, as a vain Traveller, an empty Politician, an insolent Pedant, and an idle Pretender to Learning.<sup>12</sup>

The last shape, of course, was peculiarly annoying to a defender of the Royal Society, which felt that it had been deceived.

For our purpose it may be well to itemize the grounds of defense employed by Sprat. In the matter of unities he justifies English drama by European standards; he argues from the nature of drama, defines plays with respect to their ends; he argues from the art by which a play attains its end; he finds that nature is satisfied by blank verse, that variety of plot and character are persuasive means (art) to the end of instruction, surpassing "the grave Delight of Heroick Poetry," which characterizes French tragedy. Decorum in characters is to be judged by nature, of which a play is an image, and particularly by the kind of nature appropriate to the play. In short, Sprat accepts the unities with qualifications in the interest of delight but rejects the French doctrine of decorum and use of rhyme in the interest of nature. English plays are superior both in nature and in art; the

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.

English way to the end of drama is superior because it is more lively, and therefore more persuasive in its instruction. Such an approach, it may be observed, is not uninstructive for the *Essay of dramatic poesy*.

While Sorbière and Sprat may be said to have launched the debate officially,<sup>13</sup> they by no means defined all of the issues. If this admission seems to grant them more importance than they deserve, it will suffice to indicate the background for the argument which engages Dryden's "wits."<sup>14</sup> The Sorbière incident was at least an event in a controversy wider but now less substantial than Howard's Preface to *Four new plays*.

In that preface Howard devotes his time to a defense of English plays which is no extenuation of his own; rather, as he says with respect to rhyme, his own error by following in part the method which he condemns. Howard debates some issues that were neglected by Sprat but are discussed by Dryden, and in general broadens the argument to include the Ancients, whom the French imitate. He introduces his defense in these words:<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Guilloton (pp. 8-9) shows that this debate was restrained: "Dans une lettre à Louis XIV du 21 juillet 1664—quinze jours après l'arrêt qui condamnait Sorbière—l'ambassadeur Cominges dit au roi qu'il est intervenu auprès de Charles II pour empêcher certains membres de la Société Royale 'qui déjà taillaient leurs plumes' pour lui répondre, de riposter au voyageur français. Le roi d'Angleterre a dû menacer 'ces Messieurs de l'Académie' pour les obliger à lui apporter les matériaux déjà préparés pour leur réplique." Nevertheless, Sprat's "Letter to Wren" (*Observations*) was dated August 1, 1664, and some covert, though partial, replies seem to have been made.

<sup>14</sup> The opening of the *Essay* further characterizes the wits who are introduced in the Dedication. Oddly enough, on "that memorable day" Eugenius, if he is Buckhurst, presumably shared in the victory over the Dutch rather than in that over the French. The *Essay* is described in the *Defence* as "a little discourse in dialogue, for the most part borrowed from the observations of others." Too often "others" has been restricted to foreign sources.

<sup>15</sup> For convenience references to Howard and Dryden are made to *Dryden & Howard, 1664-1668*, ed. D. D. Arundell (Cambridge, 1929); cited hereafter as "Arundell."

Yet I shall presume to say something in the justification of our nation's plays, (though not of my own), since in my judgment—without being partial to my Country—I do really prefer our plays as much before any other nation's as I do the best of ours before my own.<sup>16</sup>

Finding the Ancients deficient in plot and wit, although their comedy has some pretenses to both, he proceeds to define the French way in terms of the Ancient pattern. Two aspects of this way, to which the English have become susceptible, are attacked: "presenting the business in relations" and writing in rhyme. The method of the Ancients was forced upon them by their subjects, but the French commit the error without the necessity. "If these premises be granted," he argues, "'tis no partiality to conclude that our English plays justly challenge the preeminence."<sup>17</sup> Coming when it did, Howard's Preface must have been read largely as another reply to Sorbière.

But he is ready to admit that the English differ from others less happily in one respect:

Yet I shall as candidly acknowledge that our best poets have differed from other nations (though not so happily) in usually mingling and interweaving mirth and sadness through the whole course of their plays—Ben Jonson only excepted, who keeps himself entire to one argument. And I confess I am now convinced in my own judgment that it is most proper to keep the audience in one entire disposition both of concern and attention.<sup>18</sup>

Though such "pursuing accidents" may be possible, "they may not be so proper to be presented—an entire connection being the natural beauty of all plays." To that extent Howard bows to the unities.<sup>19</sup> But, after the French, neither Italian nor Spanish plays offer him any-

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Here the unity of feeling, an aspect of the unity of action or the nonmixture of the genres.

thing worthy of imitation. In terms of Dryden's *Essay*, his argument, except for rhyme, is more in accord with that of Eugenius than with that of Crites, but it agrees with Lisideius on tragicomedy. He is against both the Ancients and the French, but allows that the Ancients had reason for their method;<sup>20</sup> among the English he evidently rates the past age, especially Jonson, above the present.

When we come to Dryden, it must be said at once that by defending rhyme he appeared to belong to the French party;<sup>21</sup> in other respects he is neither more nor less ready than other members of the English party to accept elements of the French way of drama. Dryden himself placed the *Essay* in relation to the quarrel with Howard about rhyme, explicitly in the *Defence of an Essay*, and implicitly in the *Essay* by borrowing Howard's arguments. Others have attempted to saddle all of Crites' arguments upon Howard, but such an assimilation does not correspond to the facts; nor does it seem to have been a part of Dryden's purpose, for this allusion in his Dedication applied to no one so well as to Howard:

Even Tully had a controversy with his dear Atticus; and in one of his Dialogues, makes him sustain the part of an enemy in philosophy, who, in his letters, is his confident of state, and made privy to the most weighty affairs of the Roman Senate.<sup>22</sup>

In context this remark is part of an apology for his own opinions, "which were first made public."<sup>23</sup> Then Dryden gives this description of the *Essay*:

.... the relation of a dispute betwixt some of our wits upon this subject, in which they did

<sup>20</sup> Of course, Thomas Rymer became the chief English advocate for the Ancients.

<sup>21</sup> Howard had stigmatized rhyme as part of the French way, but Dryden speaks of his "adversaries" in the Dedication of the *Essay*.

<sup>22</sup> Arundell, p. 20.

<sup>23</sup> See his recapitulation of the controversy with Howard at the close of the *Defence of an Essay*.

not only speak of plays in verse, but mingled, in the freedom of discourse, some things of the ancient, many of the modern ways of writing; comparing those with these, and the wits of our nation with those of others.<sup>24</sup>

Needless to say, the quarrel between the ancient and modern ways of writing is also represented in the quarrel between the French and English. Therefore, Dryden's opening remark to the reader becomes less puzzling to a modern reader: "The drift of the ensuing Discourse was chiefly to vindicate the honour of our English writers, from the censure of those who unjustly prefer the French before them."<sup>25</sup> Howard could have made a similar claim for his Preface. Altogether, this remark, like Howard's Preface, suggests an occasion, beyond the quarrel about rhyme, to which such a vindication of the English would be relevant. Sorbière provided such an occasion, if only by making a French party among the English all the more obnoxious.

Dryden's next sentence to the reader emphasizes the occasional aspect of the *Essay* at the expense of its general character: "This I intimate, lest any should think me so exceeding vain, as to teach others an art which they understand much better than myself." Despite this protestation, the author of the Preface to *The Duke of Lerma* took the *Essay* as a sign of such vanity in Dryden. But the *Essay* itself bears out Dryden's claim; for it has all the marks of a vindication, weighing the charges which had been made against English drama and marshaling the arguments which had been or could be used to refute them. It is not incidental to this purpose that he, like Howard, also entertains the reader "with what a good play should be"; it is, however, central to another purpose.

In the *Essay*, rhyme is the issue reserved for final and separate debate, but

<sup>24</sup> Arundell, p. 21.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

it was the issue which Dryden first set up, and thereby compromised his native stand. Dryden invokes European example only in support of rhyme, but even then he asserts English precedent for it—more vigorously in the *Essay*, though he is already anti-French in the Dedication of *The rival ladies*.<sup>26</sup> To his praise in these works of the perfecters of English rhyme he added, in his enthusiasm, the dedication of the *Essay* to one of those translators of Corneille's *Pompey* who had provided him with a dazzling argument for English rhymed plays.<sup>27</sup> It has long been recognized that Dryden put Howard's arguments against rhyme into the mouth of Crites, but not that Sprat anticipated Howard in arguing against rhyme, especially its unnaturalness. Therefore Neander is really answering both, as well as justifying an English use of a prominent feature of the French way of drama.

The *Essay* ought to be examined for its disposition of previous argument, apart from rhyme. It will be remembered that Crites and Lisideius are spokesmen for the Ancients and French respectively, and that Eugenius and Neander are partners in rebuttal. Just as Eugenius argues that Ancient plots are deficient, so Neander argues that French plots are deficient; and as Eugenius argues that the Ancients did not follow their method rigidly, so Ne-

ander argues that the French have departed from theirs when they sought variety. The consequence is to render the unities not indispensable but contingent upon variety.<sup>28</sup> Let us recall that the issues of plot and wit with which Crites begins the argument had been raised against the Ancients by Howard. Although he was probably not the "late writer" to whom Eugenius refers, Howard had pointed out that the subjects of the Ancients "were usually the most known stories and fables"—a fact which Eugenius proceeds to develop into a limitation upon variety and delight.<sup>29</sup> On tragedy Lisideius definitely echoes Howard's argument against this mixture, especially as it may frustrate the interest and concern of the audience.<sup>30</sup> Lisideius, moreover, answers Sprat on French plots:

But I return again to the French writers, who, as I have said, do not burden themselves too much with plot, which has been reproached to them by an ingenious person of our nation as a fault. For he says they commonly make but one person considerable in a play; they dwell upon him and his concerns, while the rest of the persons are only subservient to set him off.<sup>31</sup>

The actual words of this "ingenious person of our nation," hitherto unidentified, will be found in Sprat's remarks about the French way in reply to Sorbière. But Lisideius also interprets Sprat's argument in his answer:

If he intends this by it, that there is one person in the play who is of greater dignity

<sup>26</sup> Jonson provided English precedent not only for rhyme but also for dramatic regularity. He is very useful to Dryden, even doctrinally, in repudiating French influence.

<sup>27</sup> See the allusion to *Pompey* in the Dedication. This translation (1664)—called the "SMEC" version by a eulogist of Orinda—was a work of the wits, including not only Buckhurst but Sedley and Waller (cf. *Letters from Orinda* [1705], p. 112, and Dryden's or Tonson's *Miscellanies* [1716], II, 94). Through these names, and because of this association, Dryden's *Essay* pays still more homage to rhyme. Crites alone opposes it, but Crites is given an office appropriate to his name and dismissed in the company of Neander rather than of the wits. If Crites were Roscommon, as has been suggested, he would have written the prologue to the rival *Pompey* translated by Katharine Philips.

<sup>28</sup> Positively, of course, Dryden argues for both the unities and rhyme as aids to imitation.

<sup>29</sup> Arundell, pp. 38, 7. Obviously he was not the writer if "late" means "lately deceased." Howard does not develop the consequence mentioned by Dryden; rather he argues that these stories obliged the dramatists to resort to "relations." Cowley, now a "late" writer, characterized these stories in terms similar to those of Dryden, but with respect to epic poetry (Preface to *Poems* [1656]).

<sup>30</sup> Arundell, pp. 47–48, 8.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.

than the rest, he must tax not only theirs, but those of the ancients, and—which he would be loath to do—the best of ours.<sup>32</sup>

Sprat would not have been loath to tax an opponent with shifting his argument. Again, Lisideius goes to considerable pains to refute Howard's charges against the French method of relations;<sup>33</sup> the nexus becomes obvious when he says, "But it is objected that if one part of the play may be related, then why not all."<sup>34</sup>

The argument of Neander agrees in all respects save rhyme with the defense offered by Sprat, including the charge that French plays were based on Spanish plots. Neander refutes the arguments of Lisideius and Howard on tragicomedy, which he makes a special glory of the English.<sup>35</sup> He follows Sprat when he argues against "Lisideius and many others" who "cry up the barrenness of the French plots above the variety and copiousness of the English";<sup>36</sup> he agrees with Sprat on short speeches versus long harangues. It is in the interest of variety that he argues a weakness in Lisideius' answer to Sprat:

There is another part of Lisideius his discourse, in which he has rather excused our neighbours than commended them,—that is, for aiming only to make one person considerable in their plays.<sup>37</sup>

"Tis evident," says Neander, "that the more' the persons are, the greater will be the variety of the plot," and thus supports Sprat. He is ready to admit, however, that Lisideius has reason in what he says about relations, especially in arguing that all incredible actions be related.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 51–55.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 7. Howard had said that "they do by consequence maintain that a whole play might be as well related as acted." It might be remarked that Howard's show of logic eventually became a little irksome to Dryden.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 48, 8.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61–62. Howard argued that it was impossible to represent some parts of the stories used by the Ancients.

Here, of course, he is arguing partly against Howard; but Lisideius is not allowed a victory, for the French have erred grossly in this respect, and a mean between French and English practice is best. Howard had argued that the French used relations without regard to necessity. When Neander argues "that we have many plays of ours as regular as any of theirs, and which, besides, have more variety of plot and characters,"<sup>39</sup> he comes pretty close to summing up Sprat's defense, including regularity as a criterion.

If Sorbière may be said to have initiated the occasion for the *Essay*, and the *Essay* itself may be allowed to reveal an appropriate orientation, the question may then be asked why Dryden delayed its publication from 1665–66, the apparent date of composition,<sup>40</sup> until 1668. The most obvious answer is supplied by the Plague and Fire. Actually the *Essay* was entered in the Stationers' Register, August 7, 1667, and thus was probably intended for publication in the same year as the *Annus mirabilis*.<sup>41</sup> The delay, which is magnified by the publication date, requires no other explanation, since *The Indian emperor*, though registered May 26, 1665, was not printed until late in

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>40</sup> See the Dedication of the *Essay*. The remark in the Dedication that he has since laid aside the writing of plays in rhyme until he has more leisure seems rather odd when we consider that although he did not defend rhyme in comedy, he laid it aside (*after The maiden queen*) only to write comedies.

<sup>41</sup> The Prefatory Epistle to this poem, dated from Charlton, Wiltshire, November 10, 1666, asks Howard to see the poem through the press; it was published early in 1667, and celebrated the late fire as well as the un concluded Dutch war. *The maiden queen*—apparently read by Howard between his "first perusal" and his "correction" of the *Annus mirabilis* (cf. Epistle) and staged early in 1667—was entered in the Stationers' Register at the same time as the *Essay*, and had been published by January 18, 1668, when Pepys bought a copy "newly printed." Dryden's remark about laying rhyme aside since that time should make *The maiden queen* at least contemporary with the *Essay*.

1667.<sup>42</sup> The retrospective note in the Dedication of the *Essay* springs from the same interval, which overlaps Dryden's retirement in the country.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, because of the interruption of normal life by the Plague and Fire, the loss in timeliness was less than it would seem; Sprat's *Observations* reappeared in 1668. While the king's attempt to prevent any reply to Sorbière may have made Dryden's vindication more indirect, no doubt Dryden wrote the *Essay* chiefly to explore and define his own theories of dramatic art—not without regard to the taste of the Court, to which he owed so much—and his recent success with *The Indian emperor* encouraged him to undertake it.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the enforced delay, which made 1667 the earliest date for the publication of the *Essay*, there can be no doubt that it was an ambitious work or that it had a dual purpose. All this is clear from the address "To the reader." I have already quoted the first part of that address, which intimates the occasional aspect of

<sup>42</sup> The interval between registration and publication, even for Dryden's plays, usually was very much shorter. For bibliographical details concerning these works see Hugh MacDonald's *Bibliography* (Oxford, 1939).

<sup>43</sup> The opening sentence of the *Essay*, however, seems to place the *Essay* later than the date assigned in the Dedication; for Dryden's phrase "in the first summer of the late war" could not have been written much before the entry in the Stationers' Register, since the "late war" was concluded in the preceding month with the Peace of Breda. This suggests, despite Dryden's protest, revision.

<sup>44</sup> *The maiden queen*, however, his first attempt to embody his new formula (cf. Prologue), was saved by the king's approval (cf. Preface). In the Preface to *Juvenal* (1693) he speaks of the *Essay* as a product of the time "when I was drawing the outlines of an art, without any living master to instruct me in it; an art which had been better praised than studied here in England. . . . I was sailing in a vast ocean, without other help than the pole-star of the ancients, and the rules of the French stage amongst the moderns, which are extremely different from ours, by reason of their opposite taste." He was speaking to the man to whom he dedicated the *Essay*.

the *Essay*. The latter part suggests a more general purpose:

But if this incorrect Essay, written in the country without the help of books or advice of friends, shall find any acceptance in the world, I promise to myself a better success of the second part, wherein the virtues and faults of the English poets who have written either in this, the epic, or lyric way, will be more fully treated of, and their several styles impartially imitated.<sup>45</sup>

That which has been inadequately treated, or neglected in favor of a party defense, will be the main subject of a second part. This more general purpose Dryden fulfilled, at least in large part, but not as he anticipated; rather in the form of occasional essays attached to other works.<sup>46</sup> For the dramatic way he has many essays to show; for the epic way, several essays and parts of essays; for the lyric way, various miscellaneous passages.

This "incorrect Essay"—later honored by revision, though not of its alleged defects—still keeps a place apart in his criticism, but least for its dual motivation, which makes it, like most of his essays, both occasional and general in nature; it keeps that place, aside from merit, for its ambitious program, dialogue form, and basic principles. Yet even in "drawing the outlines of an art" Dryden had adjusted his argument both to occasion and to principle.

#### UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

<sup>45</sup> Arundell, p. 22.

<sup>46</sup> The groundwork for his later criticism was laid in the *Essay* and the "Account" of the *Anns*, which overlap on rhyme and the "proper wit of poetry." The Preface to *Troilus and Cressida*, for example, is no radical departure from the *Essay*. While the authorities are new—Bossu, Rapin, Longinus—the argument still owes much to Corneille's *Discourses*, particularly on manners and the properties of the action, even to the founding of pity and fear on the chief character—a rule not "fully enough discovered to us."

## SHAFTESBURY'S EARLIEST CRITIC<sup>1</sup>

A. OWEN ALDRIDGE

**A**LTHOUGH one might assume from Shaftesbury's apologetic attitude in the *Characteristics* toward the 1699 version of *An inquiry concerning virtue or merit* that the work was not worthy of serious consideration, much less a formal reply; and although, from his efforts to buy up the entire edition, one would think it physically impossible for the work to have any influence on the public, the work was given detailed examination in sixty-three pages of a pamphlet occasioned directly by the *Inquiry*, and this pamphlet was considered significant enough to be abstracted and reviewed in the *History of the works of the learned*.<sup>2</sup> This pamphlet, by Robert Day, *Free thoughts in defence of a future state* (London, 1700), is not listed in any bibliography of Shaftesbury, for bibliographers have failed to connect it with Shaftesbury, probably because neither his name nor the *Inquiry* appears in Day's title.<sup>3</sup> The only reference comes at the end of a very long subtitle: "With occasional remarks on a book intituled, *An inquiry concerning virtue*."

The *Inquiry*, Shaftesbury's only attempt at a systematic presentation of his thought, contained in 1699 the essence of his philosophy. When it reappeared in 1711 as Treatise IV of the *Characteristics*, introduced as "printed first in 1699" and "formerly printed from an imperfect copy; now corrected and published en-

tire," the earlier version was described as "an unshapen foetus or false birth," which would probably never have come into the world in its more decent form had it not been for the accidental publication of the *Letter of enthusiasm*, which "by a necessary train of consequences, occasioned the revival of this abortive piece."<sup>4</sup> In a personal letter written in 1709, Shaftesbury describes the *Inquiry* as "an imperfect thing, brought into the world many years since, contrary to the author's design, in his absence beyond sea, and in a disguised, disordered style."<sup>5</sup> The circumstances of publication are found in the "Life sketch" by Shaftesbury's son:

During my father's stay in Holland an imperfect edition of his Inquiry after Virtue was printed, surreptitiously taken from a rough draft, sketched when he was but twenty years of age. He was greatly chagrined at this, and immediately bought up the whole impression before many of the books were sold, and set about completing the Treatise which he published himself not long after.<sup>6</sup>

*Free thoughts* is important, first of all, in substantiating this account of the circulation of Shaftesbury's manuscript. Day's first pages are given over to a treatment of the notion of a future state as he encountered it in general among his acquaintance and in particular in certain reflections in a private manuscript by an anonymous author. A suspicious mind

<sup>1</sup> This article was written with the support of a grant from the American Philosophical Society.

<sup>2</sup> II (March, 1700), 161-66.

<sup>3</sup> The work appeared anonymously but is attributed to Robert Day in Watt's *Bibliotheca Britannica* (Edinburgh, 1824), I, 292.

<sup>4</sup> *Characteristics*, ed. J. M. Robertson (London, 1900), II, 273-74. Hereafter cited as "Robertson."

<sup>5</sup> In a letter to Michael Ainsworth, June 3, 1709 (*Life, unpublished letters, and philosophical regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*, ed. Benjamin Rand [London, 1900], p. 405).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

would be likely to conclude that the "anonymous manuscript" was just a straw man set up for the author's convenience in scoring an easy victory. On page 20, however, the author announces that *An inquiry concerning virtue* is the tract he has referred to, "having formerly had a sight of the M.S. tho yet ignorant of the Author." One has reason to conclude, therefore, that Day had begun his answer to the *Inquiry* some time before its appearance in print, unaware that it ever would appear in print.

Apart from furnishing this bibliographical evidence, *Free thoughts* is important as the first direct attack on Shaftesbury's only formal and systematic presentation of philosophy—a work in which Shaftesbury appears, to use his own words, as a "plain dogmatist, a formalist, and man of method; with his hypothesis tacked to him, and his opinions so close sticking as would force one to call to mind the figure of some precise and strait-laced professor in a university."<sup>7</sup> *Free thoughts* is important in its own right in anticipating the arguments of Clarke, Wollaston, Waterland, and other champions of orthodoxy, some of whom followed Day almost verbally. Furthermore, by bringing into the foreground Shaftesbury's doctrine that a belief in future rewards and punishments, is more of a deterrent than an aid in virtue, *Free thoughts* serves to duplicate the Fénelon-Bossuet dispute over the same subject. The doctrine, generally associated with Shaftesbury during the century, was subsequently attacked by a large number of Shaftesbury's literary opponents.

At first glance it may seem that the doctrine of a future state should occupy only a minor position in a perspective of Shaftesbury's total thought, but actually it looms large both in the *Inquiry* and in

the *Characteristics*. There are two possible reasons for Shaftesbury's determined attack on the doctrine: his hostility toward theological bigotry and narrowness and his advocacy of benevolent disinterestedness in morals. Although most critics accept the former reason, the latter alone seems to be borne out by analysis of Shaftesbury's work. The exponents of revealed religion were more vulnerable in many more significant salients than the doctrine of eternity. Moreover, the *Inquiry* cannot be considered an attack on religion, for the conclusion of the first half specifically states that "the perfection and height of virtue must be owing to the belief of a God." Day, furthermore, in his frequent observations on the character of his adversary never accuses him of impiety or infidelity. He speaks of "the respect which I have, and I think I ought to have for our Author" and looks upon him "to be a man of Virtue and Probity." Compare this with the furious attacks on the *Letter concerning enthusiasm*, which clearly reflects on religious organizations, although silent on a future state. One writer vilifies the letter and its author in such harsh terms as "execrable Design, malicious and ignorant Falsehood, false and wicked Insinuations, Little Efforts of Wit and Malice, he acts a Popish part, he fights against God, he hath little regard to good Sense, he promotes Deism and Atheism."<sup>8</sup> The *Letter concerning enthusiasm* and the *Essay on wit and humour*, which gave greatest offense to Shaftesbury's clerical opponents, are the works which contain least of Shaftesbury's philosophy. The *Inquiry*, which crystallizes his philosophy, holds nothing to undermine Christianity. Here the doc-

<sup>7</sup> Robertson, II, 240.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Jenkins in his preface to *Remarks on some books lately publish'd* (London, 1709), quoted by John Edwards, *Some new discoveries of the uncertainty, deficiency, and corruptions of human knowledge and learning* (London, 1714), p. 200.

trine of a future state is considered only in its ethical applications.

The purpose of Book I is to demonstrate the relation between religion and virtue. Shaftesbury shows, first of all, that everything in the universe is arranged according to a good order and agreeable to general interest; then he proceeds to the species and individuals of animals within the universal system. Their conduct, he states, is to be esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural, according to their affection. We do not say that a man is good "when he abstains from executing his ill purpose through a fear of some impending punishment, or through the allurement of some exterior reward."<sup>9</sup> This, in essence, is Shaftesbury's objection to the doctrine of a future state. Since the nature of virtue consists "in a certain just disposition or proportionable affection of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong," only actions so motivated and without the expectation of reward can be denominated virtuous or meritorious. Individual conduct and virtue are greatly influenced by the belief or disbelief in God. If the deity be considered as an arbitrary power enforcing obedience to his absolute will by particular rewards and punishments and if, on this account, the creature be incited to do good or refrain from evil, "there is in this case . . . no virtue or goodness whatsoever."<sup>10</sup> If the deity be considered, on the other hand, as worthy and good, being understood to have, besides mere power and knowledge, "a high and eminent regard to what is good and excellent, a concern for the good of all, and an affection of benevolence and love towards the whole, such an example must undoubtedly serve . . . to raise and increase the affection towards virtue." Where this theistic belief is en-

tire and perfect, the opinion of the superintendency of a supreme Being will vastly increase both the shame of guilty actions and the honor of just ones. The fear of future punishments and the hope of reward, however, cannot be considered to stem from good affections, nor can this fear or hope be considered as consistent with goodness and merit. "If it be true piety to love God for his own sake, the over-solicitous regard to private good expected from him must of necessity prove a diminution of piety."<sup>11</sup> The natural and good affection described above is shown in Book II to be the basis of all happiness.

Let us turn now to Day's answer to this reasoning, an answer in which an attempt is made to demonstrate that the consideration of future advantages is a just motive to virtue, and the consideration of future loss and misery a powerful and becoming restraint of vice. It may be remarked in passing that this earliest commentator is about the mildest of all of Shaftesbury's dissenting critics. His tone is polite and temperate. Neither a fanatic nor a professional controversialist, Day displays modesty, sincerity, and much sound thinking. Like the more famous defenders of orthodoxy—Clarke and Wollaston—he argues entirely independently of revelation. He has not disputed from Scripture, he explains, "not out of any contempt of that Authority which he reverences as he ought, but only because the Persons with whom he disputes, dare to call that Authority in question."<sup>12</sup> The chief faults of the pamphlet are in its looseness of style. The work was obviously written piecemeal over an extensive period of time and apparently casually published with no attempt at revision or organization. Day begins his discourse with an account of various conversations he

<sup>9</sup> Robertson, I, 247.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 267.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 269.

<sup>12</sup> *Free thoughts*, "To the reader."

has had concerning the opinion held by some of his acquaintance that "no Action could be properly call'd virtuous, which was done in prospect of advantage to be had in a future State." After presenting at length his own notions on the subject, he introduces a reflection which he has lately met in a private manuscript "that to do good in hopes of Reward hereafter, increases the vicious Principle of Selfishness."<sup>13</sup> After extended remarks on this principle as presented in the anonymous tract, he identifies it as the manuscript version of the *Inquiry*. At this point he begins a rather disconnected citation and analysis of particular passages, introducing in the process of his argument a gentleman who, having seen some of his papers, remonstrates concerning his false logic and a friend who has some meditations in hand on a related subject. These references reveal lapses in time of composition which the author is at no pains to conceal. In addition, his style, quite apart from the line-by-line method of criticism with its consequent loss of integration—a fault common enough in the period—is noticeably prolix and tautological.

Day's initial argument is in the form of an analogy between actions done in prospect of advantage in a future state and those done out of regard to the present. As "He that takes an honest Care of the Interests of his own Person, Family, Friends and Country in this Life" is acknowledged to act rationally and wisely, so he who takes a diligent care of his own interests and the interests of others in a future state must likewise be acknowledged to act rationally and wisely; "and to act rationally and wisely, is to act virtuously."<sup>14</sup> Day next examines the objection that to do those actions which are accounted virtues in view of advantage to

be gained by them is mercenary and base. His examination consists primarily of an analysis of the semantics of the word "mercenary." The word is esteemed a term of reproach, he says, because an ambitious prince commonly hires mercenary soldiers to assist him in a career of oppression; whereas the just and honorable prince relies on the militia for the protection of the state. When serving the ambitious prince, the more strenuously the mercenary fights, the worse man he is, unless he is engaged in a cause in which honor and conscience justify him; then his valor is true virtue. Conversely, it would not be valor, but rashness, in any soldier to offer himself to danger in any cause in which he had no advantage to seek or interest to defend. The militia soldier, although not fighting for pay, serves to defend his country in which he has a private interest.

The short of this is, He is a base Mercenary that does an ill thing for Gain: He is a worthy Mercenary that does a justifiable thing for Gain. The prospect of Advantage in one kind or other, is the Motive of all the Deliberate Actions of a rational Man . . . and therefore the prospect of Advantage, whether in this or a future State, cannot take from a moral Action the praise of Virtue.

Day next launches out at the "glorius" saying that "a good Man loves Virtue for its own sake," which, at first, he quotes from an unnamed friend but later affixes to the *Inquiry*.<sup>15</sup> Although a habitually good man may take such satisfaction in virtuous deeds that he may frequently practice them without consideration of future compensation, nevertheless, Day says, "much the greatest part of Virtue, consists in doing good at the price of suffering Evil: and few, very few (in my poor opinion) would practice Virtue under severe present Discourage-

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 48, 54.

ments, if they had no Hope beyond this Life." Day next quotes Bishop Taylor, an authority whom Shaftesbury himself was to use later in the *Letter concerning enthusiasm*. It is impossible, says the bishop, that a man should "suffer nobly without consideration of a Reward; and since much of Virtue consists in suffering evil things, Virtue it self is not a Happiness, but the way to one."<sup>16</sup> This is all preliminary to Day's formal reply to the principle in the anonymous manuscript (the *Inquiry*) that "to do good in hopes of Reward hereafter, increases the vicious Principle of Selfishness," the heart of Shaftesbury's attack on the selfish scheme of ethics, whether found in the philosophy of Hobbes, the doctrines of Christianity, or the precepts of daily living. Before answering directly, however, Day makes a premise concerning the term "reward," of which, he remarks, the adversary hopes to make some advantage. Some good men are firmly persuaded, he says, going on to summarize one of the principal arguments of the *Inquiry*, that awareness of virtue, born of just affections and regulated passions, creates in the mind greater satisfactions and pleasures than pleasures of sense can create. These men believe, as a consequence, that the noblest idea we can frame of future happiness consists in having our good affections improved and that the most excruciating idea of future misery conceivable is having horrid, monstrous, and unnatural affections—misplaced, irregular, and extravagant passions. These men think, therefore, future existence to be improperly denoted by the terms "rewards" and "punishments." So much Day is willing to concede to his opponents without further contending about words, clearing the way for a consideration of the principle "that to do good in hopes of Reward increases the vicious

Principle of Selfishness." Instead of challenging the truth of Shaftesbury's assertion, Day, taking a line to be followed by other clergymen, defends selfishness. The ensuing argument is a preventer rebuttal of Shaftesbury's theories of the origin of society. First, he says, selfishness is innate, and no man may divest himself of it; second, the selfish principle is not vicious in its own nature, "but becomes so only by being pursued irregularly." An ordered society is regulated selfishness. Each member has voluntarily surrendered several of his natural rights for the better preservation of what he has not given up. Thus he is bound in reason and in conscience not to pursue his private interest to the detriment of the public or to the prejudice of another person who is in straits; to be selfish, however, when neither the public nor any private person is damaged thereby, "is natural, necessary and honest," and he who does not then pursue his private interest is a fool or a madman. The prospect of reward has nothing in it to make selfishness vicious, "for a Man cannot do himself too much good, if in doing himself good he does others no injury."<sup>17</sup>

Day reveals a slight inconsistency in discussing what he calls the next part of the objection, "That the wicked are restrain'd from that Wickedness from which they are restrain'd, by fear of the Civil Magistrates Vengeance." He does not refer specifically to the *Inquiry*, for Shaftesbury makes no such blunt statement, claiming only that in a state "a virtuous administration, and an equal and just distribution of rewards and punishments, is of the highest service, not only by restraining the vicious, . . . but by inspiring virtue to be apparently the interest of every one."<sup>18</sup> Day agrees that "the

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>18</sup> Robertson, I, 271.

fear of the Civil Magistrates Vengeance is a great restraint of Wickedness," but he insists that holding it to be "the only Restraint . . . is a bold Assertion, impossible to be made out." It is impossible to be made out, he says, because (1) we cannot know the hearts of men, (2) men often are governed by weak and false principles rather than by true, and (3) the fear of future misery to fall on the impenitent wicked is another prevailing restraint. After demolishing this argument—one more in line with Hobbes than with Shaftesbury—Day proceeds to compare the fear of punishment by the civil government with fear of punishment in another state. Wicked men, knowing the civil consequences of criminal deeds, commit them nevertheless; likewise, men persuaded of the future danger of immorality persist in their evil deeds. "It is as good a Consequence, that the Knowledge of the Penalties annexed to human Laws, restrains no Wickedness, as that the persuasion of the future danger of Wickedness does restrain none."<sup>19</sup> This is the best way possible to confute Shaftesbury's principle, but the argument would carry more weight had not Day, just previously, declaimed vigorously against the force of fear in civil government. One wonders whether he realized that he was thus damaging his strongest case against Shaftesbury. The comparison works both ways, against both Day and Shaftesbury. If Shaftesbury admits the force of rewards and punishments in the civil state, he must likewise admit their force if expected in a future state.<sup>20</sup> If Day is convincing enough to prove that the promise of rewards and punishments in human society is an insufficient and impotent deterrent from vicious conduct, the expectation

of future rewards and punishment would be equally weak and ineffective as a motive to virtue. In justice to Day one must repeat that he seeks to show merely that it cannot be proved the only restraint, but his arguments seem to get out of hand. Certainly, his analogy of human and divine sanctions is his first strong argument.

In proceeding to distinguish different types of fear, Day approaches the Shaftesburian theory of the innate moral sense. There is, he says, a "fear connate, born with us, . . . a fear of doing that which is odious in the sight of God and good Men, destructive of our own greatest Happiness, and injurious to others."<sup>21</sup> This fear manifests itself as "an aversion against all vile Immoralities" in the first wicked sallies, as a shame in wrongdoing.<sup>22</sup> Day parts company with Shaftesbury, however, in attributing this sense of shame to a regard for present reputation and future fatal consequences and in terming this honest care of one's own interest "degrees of virtue."

He draws close again, however, on other points. He says:

I have admitted that the Pleasures of a good Conscience, the Joys of a Mind reflecting on its own virtuous Disposition and beneficial Actings, are far more pleasant and joyous than the Joys and Pleasures of Sense; and that the Torments of a Mind reflecting on its own criminal Disorders, irregular and unnatural Passions and Affections, are far more punishing than the Pains of a wounded or diseased Body.

This is a leaf from Shaftesbury's book. Day's point, however, is that this love of virtue or even the realization that in this life there is more to be gained by virtue than by vice is still an insufficient motive to virtuous conduct for the generality of mankind. Sensual livers may admit that

<sup>19</sup> Day, p. 12.

<sup>20</sup> Shaftesbury does make this admission (Robertson, I, 270).

<sup>21</sup> Day, p. 16.

<sup>22</sup> See Robertson, I, 308-9.

virtue may have many charms and vice some immediate troubles or imminent dangers, "but they could be content a while with the Pleasures of Sense, bear the Troubles and venture the Dangers." Furthermore, even though it is generally granted that the virtuous man obtains present advantage through his virtue and the vicious man reaps suffering because of his vice, it is well known that very often the reverse exists. As long as even the possibility exists that a man may be virtuous and suffer, be vicious and prosper, how are men to be persuaded to forego vice and seek virtue? Day refuses to pass over the notorious fact, which counts heaviest against Shaftesbury's scheme, that suffering and real ill in the world are likely to be the lot of the most virtuous. This is Day's second strong argument.

At this point Day begins a line-by-line analysis of the *Inquiry*, following the usual practice of quoting a passage in italics and commenting briefly or at length, to the point or around it, according to the author's whim. Since many of the issues raised are trivial, I shall mention only those which are essential to Shaftesbury's system. Day agrees in general with Shaftesbury's distinctions between atheism, polytheism, and theism; with his assumptions concerning the wisdom and benevolence of the supreme designing mind; and with the principle that the interest or good of each creature in the universe contributes to the order of the whole. His first major objection is directed against the insinuation of the following passage: "Nor do we say a Man is a good Man, when his Hands are ty'd, which hinders him from doing the harm that he has a mind to do, . . . which draws him from his Ill intention."<sup>23</sup> Shaftesbury is here making his way to the main purpose of his book, the introducing of the doc-

trine of disinterestedness, which Day terms "not only erroneous, but also discouraging to Virtue and destructive to Society." He objects at the outset, therefore, saying that not being able to carry out an evil purpose and abstaining from doing so out of fear of impending danger or allurement of advantage are not the same or nearly the same thing, for, in the first instance, one is restrained by exterior force and, in the second, one uses reason. Although Day grants that a man who abstains from evil solely for his sensual pleasure and secular advantage has not exercised his reason "to form those true Notions in his mind which are requisite to set a value upon his abstinence from evil," still he insists that all hopes and fears are not so base.<sup>24</sup> The surgeon, for example, who refrains from experimenting upon his patient, which he could do with impunity, may be restrained by the fear of doing a base thing, and thus his abstinence is praiseworthy. Immediately after this concession to disinterestedness, however, Day faces about, saying that all rational acts are always influenced by hope and fear. "What signifies the *Decor facti* so much talk'd of, the comeliness and fitness of the Action call'd virtuous, but the advantageousness thereof to one's Self, Country, Neighbourhood, near Relation, Friend, Acquaintance?" Much of Shaftesbury's argument, Day points out, consists in stressing the epithet *private* in private pleasure or advantage, which he otherwise calls "private good" or "self-good." Day admits in part that some actions thus motivated are deprecated. Then to explain exactly what is intended by this admission, Day proceeds to define virtuous conduct, showing specifically how his practical utilitarianism differs from Shaftesbury's abstract idealism. A man's chief good, he says, consists in

<sup>23</sup> See *ibid.*, I, 247.

<sup>24</sup> Day, p. 26.

just and equal Affections, whereby he is dispos'd to take a wise care of his Health, a duly proportion'd regard of his secular Interests, and to employ a constant study and labour to do good to all Mankind, as far as his Abilities can reach, and in the order as this or that Society or Person most reasonably calls for a prior regard. These just and equal Affections create to a Man greater Happiness than can accrue to him from secular Satisfactions.

So much is in accord with Shaftesbury, but the next step is not. If the mind of man shall exist again, Day continues, "it shall exist with these just and equal Affections, in beneficent degrees still improving, more useful to others, and more happy in itself," just as, in this life, happiness is increased in proportion to the good affections. A regard to this hope, Day declares, denying Shaftesbury's principal tenets, disposes us "to Virtue more powerfully than the Consideration of the Happiness which Virtue creates to us in this Life."

Day next takes up the complicated question of self-love versus social love, defining their limits in virtuous conduct. By making a distinction between private good and secular private good, he is able to assert that man's private good is the same as the good of society and still allow for conduct based on personal interest:

There is implanted in Mankind a strong Principle of Self-love prior to all kind respect towards others: we cannot but love our own honest secular Interest, before the honest secular Interest of another Man; our private Self-good future, more ardently than the private Self-good future of another Man. We do ill only when we prefer a small secular Interest of our own before a weighty Interest of another, whose condition is sad and piteable, or before a weighty certain Interest of the Publick, or before a probability that we may happen to have in our hands of promoting the Interests of Virtue.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Whereupon Day asserts with some justice that he is "speaking something more distinctly than our Author has done."

Day next assigns his reasons for thinking that the mind of man should exist again after death, adding in a modest vein that it is only probability, not sensible demonstration, that he pretends to. He bases his argument on a hypothesis which he says the author of the *Inquiry* admits and calls "perfect theism," that everything in the universe is according to a good order, agreeable to the general interest, and perfectly contrived. If this much is true, then man must exist again; for an order of things without future existence is not the best order which we can imagine. Were it true that sin was punished with adequate pain and virtue rewarded with adequate pleasure in this life, then there would be no need of a future state to justify the order of things. But just the opposite state of affairs prevails in this life—a statement which hardly needs the proving. Here Day is leading up to an expression of the hope which the patriarch Job, at the climax of his quest for an answer to the riddle of his suffering, struggled in vain to assert and to believe—the hope that, since there is obviously no just dispensation of rewards and punishments in this life, there must be a future state in which good will be rewarded and evil punished.

It is not necessary to multiply examples to show that many heinous crimes are not adequately punished in this life. Indeed, frequently, as Day observes, "the less guilty suffer most, and the most guilty least, or not at all."<sup>26</sup> Virtuous conduct is by no means an assurance of inevitable reward in this life, although, as Day admits, there is truth in Shaftesbury's principle that, generally speaking, virtue tends to promote the good of the

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

individual as well as society and it would become a wise man to practice virtue even though he was certain of not being rewarded. Yet—and this is the important qualification—there are cases

in which Virtue may accidentally happen to be unserviceable to a private Man, and wholly unable to create him present Joys equal to the Labours and Dangers thereof. Nay, there are cases, in which some Virtues, aiming at the Service of the Publick, may become effectual to the utter ruin of a Man's Fortune, Friends, Health, Life.<sup>27</sup>

For example, a citizen's effort to preserve to society the safe and secure enjoyment of trade and liberties—a truly glorious instance of virtue—may produce the greatest satisfaction and pleasure of mind and at the same time bring about great misfortune to his wife and children, ruin his health, and shorten his days. Prison may even be his lot. Day wonders what comfort the patriot can find in the consciousness of his integrity when he sees that it has undone himself and his dearest relatives and that he is “dying for ever, and never like to be the better for his Virtue hereafter.”

At this point Day turns to the Scriptures, not to support his argument, but to cite against himself the most telling argument that could be used, Paul's wish to be an anathema from Christ for the salvation of his brethren. Day says of this that “our Preachers do not exact the words of *Paul* literally.” According to Day: “As no Man can wish to be miserable hereafter, that others may be happy hereafter; so no Man who looks upon this Life as the end of all things to him, can be content to be miserable in this Life, in hopes to make others happy in this Life.” This is stated in the triumphant confidence that both propositions are true; whereas Paul challenges the first, and Shaftesbury the second.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Here Day is not only wandering from his main argument but showing poor forensic skill in summoning to the stand a witness who testifies in favor of his opponent.

He returns to the argument by treating another potential objection against this system of self-love, the giving of one's life for one's country or friends. Day merely asserts that without a belief in a future state this could not be done by any “but a humorous Man, whose Fancy is overheated with metaphysical lofty unaccountable Extravagancies.” This is ridicule of benevolent ethics but hardly vindication of self-love. Day is thus forced to consider the remonstrance of some of his friends that it is just, fitting, and reasonable that the public interest should be preferred before the private. There is only one reason to prefer the public to the private, he asserts, “viz. Every private Member of the Society has agreed to do it, and has an Interest in doing it.” When there is no interest, there is no obligation to virtue. Thus, “upon the supposition of no future State, it appears that it is not reasonable to practise Virtue, whenever it is likely to rob us of our Fortunes, Fame, Health, or Life.”<sup>28</sup> If we ever find it reasonable to practice virtue in these difficult cases, it must be that we believe in a future state. This is Day's first proof. His next is much less logical and is harder to follow. “That Belief,” he says, “which is generally necessary for the tolerable well-being of the human System, must needs be a Belief of things certainly true: and on the contrary, that Belief which is apparently destructive of the tolerable well-being of the human System, must needs be a Belief of things absolutely false.” The belief of a future state is necessary for human well-being; therefore, the belief is

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39. This reasoning is followed almost word for word by Waterland in *Scripture vindicated* (1730) (*Works of the Rev. Daniel Waterland*, ed. William Van Mildert [Oxford, 1856], II, 108).

true, and a future state exists. Day spends all his talents justifying the minor premise of this strange syllogism, taking the major for granted. Yet it is the major which will not stand scrutiny. Apply this premise, for example, to the theory of evolution. May we assume that the theory is true if its effects upon society are salutary, false if its effects are baleful? Obviously, this is an entirely irrelevant criterion, for evolution, like every other belief, is true only if supported by adequate evidence. Judged by this phase of his reasoning, Day seems to be ensnared in the benevolent system himself. His proofs of the minor proposition, however, conflict with Shaftesbury more directly and are perhaps more valid. Shaftesbury denies that a belief in a future state is generally "necessary" for social well-being, although enshrouding his opinion in ambiguity. His intention is probably to destroy the future state as a rational or realistic conception among thinking men but to preserve it as an instrument of persuading the vulgar to follow virtue in so far as virtue is compatible with public leading. Day, in contrast, ascribes to the expectation of rewards in a future state all efforts in behalf of national welfare and liberty and in behalf of the practice of moral goodness, of charitable offices, and of commercial honesty. He even asserts that "if it were not for this belief of a future Existence, we should seldom or never have any thing great and good, useful and praise-worthy said or done: . . . we should have nothing practis'd among Men, but that Honesty which they did not lose by."<sup>30</sup> Further on he makes use of Shaftesbury's principle that there is in every creature "a certain Interest or Good, which is an end in that Creature, to which God or Nature design'd him," in order to prove that only the man who believes in God and a future state

will have persuasion powerful enough to practice the most difficult virtue and to shun the most tempting vice. If there is a future state, then "it is the Duty and Virtue of a rational Man primarily to direct his Passions and Affections for the securing of his Interest in that State"; but if his chief Interest be in this life, then he must put his interest before that of any others and thus be "utterly incapable of practising any instance of noble and difficult virtue."<sup>31</sup>

In the next section of his critique, Day discusses Shaftesbury's notions concerning the social effect of not believing in a God. Following Bacon and Bayle, Shaftesbury had declared that religion is capable of doing either great good or great harm, but atheism is incapable of any positive good or positive harm. Although, indirectly, atheism may lead to either one, it will not "be the occasion of setting up false Right and Wrong, which only fantastical Reasoning, ill Custom, or ill Religion can do."<sup>32</sup> This Day answers with the perennial saw that if one were intrusting one's fortune to an agent, one would naturally prefer a believer to an atheist. Shaftesbury's probable reply to this time-worn platitude would be the next passage Day has chosen for criticism: "It is possible for a Creature capable of using Reflection, to have a liking or dislike of moral Actions, and consequently a sense of Right and Wrong, before such time as he may have any Notion or Sense of God at all."<sup>33</sup> This passage is based on a fundamental distinction between Shaftesbury's ethics and Day's, but Day is somewhat disarmed by Shaftesbury's bland manner. Although granting, because of ensuing passages, "that our Author has no ill meaning in this," Day proceeds to declare

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>31</sup> Robertson, I, 265.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 266.

that most men would deny that a reasoning creature "can have so just a liking of moral Actions, and so true a sense of Right and Wrong, before he has the notion and sense of God" as he should have and will have afterward. This is no refutation of Shaftesbury, however, for the principle that a belief in God heightens virtue is quite in line with Shaftesbury's notions of true theism. The difference between Shaftesbury and Day is revealed when Day, with his gift for particularizing, presents his realistic view of the influence of belief upon conduct. A man with no notion or sense of God may possibly like and practice moral actions when he has no lust to gratify or danger to avoid. He will at all times gratify lust or do what he can to avoid danger, however, no matter how immoral the ends, since "in all Creatures, especially the rational, Self-love is the predominant Principle." This principle will lead the man who believes in God and a future state to prefer the interests of society to his own welfare "because he expects hereafter to find an inconceivable Advantage in so doing."<sup>33</sup> According to this hedonistic Christianity, man is a rational creature, choosing virtuous conduct at all costs now, in order to obtain pleasure and avoid pain later. According to Shaftesbury's exalted concept of human nature, man is a rational creature, finding his highest pleasure as well as highest good in virtue at all costs, at all times.

Thus Day takes exception to Shaftesbury's statement that "one who has not the opinion or belief of an intelligent Principle, or God, may, tho' very difficultly, and at a great hazard, be capable of Virtue, so as to have an Honesty, a Faith, a Justice, perhaps of great Note."<sup>34</sup> Day

confidently asserts that he has already proved this to be false, confirming his proof by quoting Shaftesbury's statement that the belief in God must be effectual in furthering good affections "by rendering every thing that is of Virtue more lovely, splendid and attractive; and every thing that is of Vice, more ignominious and deform'd." This loveliness of virtue, Day adds, becoming the first in a line of critics to call for clarification of Shaftesbury's rhapsodic effusions, consists wholly in advantage of one sort or other, "or else, 'tis an empty Phrase, mere insignificant Cant." If we assume, as Shaftesbury does, the existence of "a Being all-intelligent, all-seeing, of infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness," then we must perforce regard future existence as a necessity, since, as already proved, all things are not in a good order if we do not exist again. This is Day's principal argument, reached after many digressions and refinements: a future state is necessary to vindicate God's wisdom and goodness.<sup>35</sup>

Day's remarks on Book II of the *Inquiry*, which treats the obligation to virtue, are mainly a restatement of his first proof, leading to the argument that if we ever find it reasonable to practice virtue in "difficult cases"—cases requiring the sacrifice of fortune, health, or life—it must be on the basis of belief in a future state. Day insists that, although Shaftesbury offers many excellent arguments in favor of virtue, they are partial and inadequate, applying only in easy cases, and do

<sup>33</sup> Exactly the same argument was used twenty-two years later by William Wollaston in *The religion of nature delineated*. Wollaston first gives his reasons for assuming that God is a reasonable, just, and perfect being. Then he asserts that to deny a future state is to say "either that God is an unreasonable, unjust, cruel Being; or that no man in respect of this life (which according to him is all), has a greater share of unhappiness unavoidable, than of happiness." To say the former is to contradict the assumption concerning God's perfection; "to say the latter is to contradict the whole story of mankind, and even one's own senses" (18th ed.; London, 1759). pp. 377-78.

<sup>34</sup> P. 47.

<sup>35</sup> This passage is omitted in the 1711 edition, perhaps because of Day's references to its many qualifying phrases. The 1711 version is not so guarded or cautiously worded as the 1699.

not prove that a man is "oblig'd to cherish good Affections towards the Publick, when the doing so would expose him to Hardships and Hazards, force him to deny himself, and quit his self-preservative Passions."<sup>36</sup>

An answer to this accusation in which Shaftesbury asserts a motive to virtue strong enough to master self-preserving passion is found in two passages from the *Inquiry* which Day proceeds to discuss. Day presents them not as an answer, however, but as speciously said things which "are so unhappily worded and dispos'd, that they tempt, or at least leave room for Opinions inconsistent with the universal necessity of Virtue." The reasoning behind the following two passages could undoubtedly be reconstructed into an answer to Day, that the benevolent affections are stronger than the self-preserving passions:

To have the natural Affections, such as are founded in Love, Complacency, good Will, and in a sympathy with the Kind or Species, is to have the chief Enjoyment of Life.<sup>37</sup>

That to want the natural Affections (the above-mention'd beneficial Affections) is to be chiefly miserable.<sup>38</sup>

Day objects to the first on the ground that a man who questions the future state cannot in difficult circumstances so effectually exert his beneficent affections as he who believes; therefore, he cannot have the same high degree of satisfaction and joy. He objects to the second on the ground that it is an inadequate account of human nature. "Some vicious Men," he says, "know how to manage their Vices with a sort of Discretion, and while they sooth their Senses, and wrong their Neighbour, take care of their Health and

Fame."<sup>39</sup> Nothing can make these men uneasy but consideration of the hereafter. The only restraints of evil inclinations, that is, fear and shame, are inoperative without a belief in a future state. "For, some Persons are too big for Laws, and no Man, at least no Infidel to that Notion, blushes in the dark."

This assertion may have had something to do with Shaftesbury's famous discussion nine years later of why a man should be honest in the dark or should avoid being nasty when alone.<sup>40</sup> There are no proofs of any kind that Shaftesbury was ever aware of Day's attack or that he was influenced by it in preparing any of the treatises which make up the *Characteristics*. The following paragraph from *An essay on the freedom of wit and humour*, however, certainly summarizes Day's point of view and replies to it, whether consciously or not:

Men have not been contented to show the natural advantages of honesty and virtue. They have rather lessened these, the better, as they thought, to advance another foundation. They have made virtue so mercenary a thing, and have talked so much of its rewards, that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, which can be worth rewarding. For to be bribed only or terrified into an honest practice, bespeaks little of real honesty or worth. . . . There can be no excellence or wisdom in voluntarily rewarding what is neither estimable nor deserving.<sup>41</sup>

From the same work, the following passage also seems to fit *Free thoughts*:

"Tis orthodox divinity, as well as sound philosophy, with some men to rate life by the number and exquisiteness of the pleasing sensations. These they constantly set in opposition to dry virtue and honesty; and upon this foot they think it proper to call all men fools who would hazard a life or part with any of

<sup>36</sup> P. 59.

<sup>37</sup> Robertson, I. 293.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 336. The passage is greatly amplified in the 1711 version.

<sup>39</sup> P. 62.

<sup>40</sup> Robertson, I. 83.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

these pleasing sensations except on the condition of being repaid in the same coin and with good interest into the bargain. Thus, it seems, we are to learn virtue by usury, and enhance the value of life, and of the pleasures of sense, in order to be wise and to live well.<sup>42</sup>

Furthermore, in the detailed defense of the *Inquiry* which appears in Part II, Section III, of *The moralists*, many of Day's arguments are considered.

The theological justification of the selfish system was continued later in the century by several anti-Shaftesbury clergymen. Day, while ushering in a separate controversy over a future state, took an active part in this controversy over self-love versus social love, unequivocally speaking out in behalf of self-love. With more success than any of Shaftesbury's later critics, Day showed the logical inconsistency in Shaftesbury's system, the attempt to combine Stoic morality with theories of the benevolence of God. When asserting that "life may sometimes be even a misfortune and misery,"<sup>43</sup> Shaftesbury is in line with the Stoics, who freely admitted ill in the world but asserted that

they did not allow it to disturb them. Shaftesbury is no longer Stoic and his logic ceases to be sound, however, when he introduces theories of benevolence and asserts universal good. This is contrary not only to stoicism but to experience in life. Had Shaftesbury kept within the Stoic orbit, he would have been able to maintain that the power of virtue is sufficient in itself to enable us to endure or ignore evil. In a scheme of universal good, however, evil must be proved only partial or temporary, and this Shaftesbury fails to do. The only way out is to assert a future life. Not only does Shaftesbury refuse to take refuge in this manner; he makes an issue of his refusal.

In critics after Day, the doctrine of the future state became a rallying cry in narrow religious polemics. By virtue of being the first, and practically the only, critic to point out the logical fallacy in Shaftesbury's denial of a future state, Day deserves to be given at least as much consideration as other less penetrating critics of Shaftesbury and eighteenth-century ethical theories.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 317.

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## GOLDSMITH'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE *Critical Review*

ARTHUR FRIEDMAN

THE fact that the canon of Oliver Goldsmith's contributions to the *Critical review* has never been accurately determined is in large part owing to a scantiness of materials. Goldsmith himself has left no more than a hint of his connection with the periodical; his earliest biographers, with one minor exception, provide no evidence by which attributions can be made; and for the *Critical review* nothing is known to exist comparable to the publisher Griffiths' marked set indicating authorship of papers in the *Monthly review*. Partly as a result of these inadequacies in materials, the canon has been built up in a manner not likely to inspire complete confidence. The first attempt to collect Goldsmith's contributions to the *Critical review* came nearly twenty-five years after his death; since then, additions to the canon have been made by various men working at various times with various kinds of materials. For over a third of the twenty-eight pieces assigned to him, no evidence has ever been presented; for most of the others the evidence has not been thoroughly examined. The primary intention of this study is to re-examine these attributions in the order they have been made in the hope of distinguishing those papers which are probably by Goldsmith, those for which the evidence is too meager to make a final determination of authorship possible, and those which may safely be dropped from the canon. The question of new attributions will be given only brief consideration.

### "LITERARY ANECDOTES OF GOLDSMITH" (1774)

The first attribution of a review to Goldsmith was made almost immediately after his death in an anonymous paper in the *Westminster magazine* for April, 1774, entitled "Literary anecdotes of the late Dr. Goldsmith." Here we find the following statement:

It was the merit which he [Goldsmith] discovered in criticising a despicable translation of Ovid's *Fasti* by a pedantic schoolmaster, and his "Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning," which first introduced him to the acquaintance of Dr. Smollett.<sup>1</sup>

Although no mention is here made of the *Critical review*, it has been assumed from the reference to Smollett, who was the principal editor of that journal at the time, that the review referred to is the paper on William Massey's translation of Ovid's *Fasti* in the *Critical review* for November, 1757.<sup>2</sup> It was first included in Goldsmith's works by Prior,<sup>3</sup> and it has been reprinted by subsequent editors.

Even if it is granted that the anonymous writer in the *Westminster magazine* was referring—as seems probable—to an article by Goldsmith in the *Critical review*,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by J. W. M. Gibbs in his edition of Goldsmith's *Works* (London, 1884–86), IV, 303, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> IV, 402–9.

<sup>3</sup> *The miscellaneous works of Oliver Goldsmith*, ed. James Prior (London, 1837), IV, 418–25.

<sup>4</sup> The review of Massey's book in the *Monthly review* (XVIII [February, 1758], 127–29), to which Goldsmith had recently been a regular contributor and to which he was to return briefly toward the end of 1758, was by Grainger (see Benjamin C. Nangle, *The monthly review, first series, 1749–89: indexes of con-*

there are serious difficulties in accepting the attribution to Goldsmith of the review of Massey's translation. First, it is, in a double sense, an undistinguished piece of criticism. It is undistinguished in the sense that it does not contain any repetitions of Goldsmith's favorite ideas or phrases—repetitions of the kind that have made possible the identification of many of his anonymous writings. This fact cannot be taken as proof that he did not write the paper, for certain reviews known to be his afford no conspicuous parallels with his other works; it does, however, eliminate one line of argument for the attribution. Possibly more important, the paper has no particular distinction as a review. Of its seven pages, approximately six are taken up with quotations from Massey's translation (with parallel passages from the Latin) and from his introduction; in what amounts to a single page of original composition the reviewer begins by berating bad translations in general, introduces the quotations from the translation with some indication of their inferiority, and concludes with a short paragraph of harsh, though not particularly penetrating, judgment. It would be hard to demonstrate that this paper is inferior to certain of the reviews that Goldsmith is known to have written; but it is not clear why, to quote the author of the "Literary anecdotes" of 1774, "the merit which he discovered" in such an undistinguished piece of work should have "first introduced him to the acquaintance of Dr. Smollett."

A second difficulty in accepting the review as Goldsmith's relates to the date of its publication. The paper on Massey's translation appeared in the *Critical review* for November, 1757; his regular contribu-

*tributors and articles* [Oxford, 1934], p. 170). There is no evidence that Goldsmith was writing for any other periodical in 1757 or 1758.

tions to that periodical did not begin, as far as is known, until the number for January, 1759. During the period between these dates Goldsmith seems to have had no regular literary employment; his connection with the *Monthly review* had temporarily been terminated with his contributions to the number for September, 1757; and during the year 1758 his only published works seem to have been the translation of Marteilhe's *Memoirs of a Protestant* in February and four criticisms in the *Monthly review* for December. Thus, if the review of Massey is accepted as Goldsmith's, it becomes necessary to explain why, after attracting the attention of Smollett toward the end of 1757, he was not called upon for further reviews during a period of over a year when he had no regular literary employment. The only writer to recognize this difficulty<sup>5</sup> is Goldsmith's latest editor, J. W. M. Gibbs, who gives the following explanation:

The appearance of this Massey article in the *Critical* before the last four articles by Goldsmith in the *Monthly* is accounted for by the fact that Goldsmith left Griffiths in September, 1757. . . . But, after contributing the above, and something more perhaps, to the *Critical*, our author, in 1758, returned to the *Monthly*, writing for its proprietor, amongst other things, the four reviews dated December. . . .<sup>6</sup>

This account meets the difficulty of Goldsmith's lack of literary employment in the

<sup>5</sup> Prior avoids the difficulty in his edition (IV, 418) by dating the review of Massey, "1758"; in his biography he seems not to mention the review and says that Goldsmith's connection with the *Critical review* began "not later certainly than January 1759" (*The life of Oliver Goldsmith* [London, 1837], I, 315 [hereafter cited as "Life"]). Forster correctly dates the review as November, 1757; but he assumes in both versions of his biography that the two reviews ascribed to Goldsmith in the *Critical review* for January, 1759, appeared in "the new-year number," 1758 (*The life and adventures of Oliver Goldsmith* [London, 1848], p. 131, and *The life and times of Oliver Goldsmith* [London, 1890], pp. 95-96).

<sup>6</sup> *Works*, IV, 303, n. 3.

last months of 1757 and in 1758 by suggesting that he contributed to the *Critical review* not only the criticism of Massey but "something more perhaps" and by placing the four reviews of December, 1758, "amongst other things" which he wrote for Griffiths in 1758. The suggestion that Goldsmith made further early contributions to the *Critical review* is offered, it should be noted, merely as an unsupported guess; and it is a guess which finds no support in an examination of the journal from October, 1757, to December, 1758. Similarly, there is no evidence from the publisher Griffiths' marked copy that Goldsmith contributed anything more to the *Monthly review* during 1758 than the four papers in the December number.<sup>7</sup> Gibbs has thus in no way answered the question of why Goldsmith, if he attracted Smollett's attention by a review in November, 1757, should not have been called upon for further work until 1759.<sup>8</sup>

The only evidence for Goldsmith's authorship of the paper on Massey appears in the "Literary anecdotes" of 1774. A third difficulty in accepting the attribution is to be found in the contradictory nature of this evidence. The anonymous writer tells us that Goldsmith made the acquaintance of Smollett not only through his criticism of a translation of Ovid's *Fasti* but also through his *Enquiry into the present state of polite learning*. But it is not clear how a review of November,

1757, and a book probably not even begun in 1757<sup>9</sup> and not published until April 2, 1759, could both have "first introduced him to the acquaintance of Dr. Smollett." Indeed, if there were certainty in Prior's statement that Goldsmith "became known" to Archibald Hamilton, publisher of the *Critical review*, "some time in the year 1758" and that it was Hamilton who "is said to have been the first to introduce him to Dr. Smollett,"<sup>10</sup> then it would be hard to see how a review of November, 1757, could have played any part in the meeting.

There are, then, these three serious difficulties in admitting the review of Massey's translation into the Goldsmith canon. As opposed to them, there is the explicit statement in the "Literary anecdotes" of 1774 that a criticism of a translation of Ovid, together with the *Enquiry*, first made Goldsmith acquainted with Smollett. Is there any way in which the difficulties can be avoided while the statement is retained? I suggest that the difficulties will largely disappear if we assume that the anonymous author in the *Westminster magazine*, writing some fifteen years after the event, made one small slip: for "a despicable translation of Ovid's *Fasti*" he should have said "a despicable translation of Ovid's *Epistles*."

In the *Critical review* for January, 1759, appeared a criticism of Barrett's *Ovid's Epistles, translated into English verse*,<sup>11</sup> this review has long appeared in the Goldsmith canon, and there is, as I shall at-

<sup>7</sup> The authorship of reviews from Griffiths' set is given in Nangle's book, cited in n. 4 above. By the end of 1758, Goldsmith may have started work on his life of Voltaire for Griffiths.

<sup>8</sup> Gibbs elsewhere offers a further explanation: "It . . . appears that between Nov., 1757, and Jan., 1759, little or nothing else went into Smollett's review from Goldsmith, the latter's work upon the *Literary magazine*, 1757-8 . . . , and the following re-engagement with the *Monthly Review* supplying no doubt the sufficient reason" (*Works*, IV, 410). But, as R. W. Seitz has shown, there is no good reason to believe that Goldsmith ever contributed to the *Literary magazine* (*Review of English studies*, V [1929], 410-30).

<sup>9</sup> The *Enquiry* is first heard of in a letter of August 7, 1758, when Goldsmith says that it "is now printing in London"; Miss Balderston notes that he "is probably anticipating the event" (*The collected letters of Oliver Goldsmith*, ed. Katharine C. Balderston [Cambridge, 1928], pp. 34-35).

<sup>10</sup> *Life*, I, 315. The meeting between Goldsmith and Hamilton apparently depends on the recollection of the latter's daughter; no authority is given for the meeting between Goldsmith and Smollett.

<sup>11</sup> VII, 31-39 (*Works*, ed. Gibbs, IV, 325-33). All subsequent references to *Works* are to Gibbs's edition.

tempt to show later,<sup>12</sup> good evidence for accepting it as his. The writer in the *Westminster magazine* speaks of the translation of Ovid reviewed by Goldsmith as "by a pedantic schoolmaster"; the heading of the review of Ovid's *Epistles* describes the book as "*part of a poetical and oratorical lecture, read in the grammar-school of Ashford. . . . By St. Barrett, A.M. master of the said school,*" and the review concludes with the remark concerning the translator that "tho' he may be an excellent schoolmaster, he has . . . no pretensions to taste." Thus the suggested change requires the alteration of a single word in the "Literary anecdotes" and does not necessitate the addition of a new work to the Goldsmith canon.

If it is assumed that the author of the "Literary anecdotes" intended to refer to Barrett's translation of Ovid's *Epistles*, all the difficulties raised in relation to Massey's translation of Ovid's *Fasti* almost completely disappear. First, the review of Barrett, unlike that of Massey, is a distinguished piece both in the sense that it expresses some of Goldsmith's characteristic ideas and in the sense that it is one of his more witty and thoughtful reviews<sup>13</sup>—and as such might well have attracted Smollett's attention. Second, the time of the publication of the paper on Barrett offers no difficulty, since Goldsmith seems to have begun a more or less regular connection with the *Critical review* at exactly the time when it appeared. Third, it is possible that the review of Barrett and the *Enquiry* came to Smol-

lett's attention at about the same time. The review was probably written in January, 1759;<sup>14</sup> the book, though not published until April 2, must have been at least in proof by January, for Goldsmith seems to have expected publication by the beginning of February.<sup>15</sup> If, then, one word is changed, the account in the "Literary anecdotes" of Goldsmith's acquaintance with Smollett can be accepted with little or no difficulty.

What conclusions, finally, can be arrived at concerning the reliability of the ascription to Goldsmith of a review of Ovid's *Fasti*? If we disregard the possibility—for which there is no evidence—that the writer in the *Westminster magazine* was referring to a criticism published in some periodical other than the *Critical review*, three conclusions would seem possible. (1) We may conclude, in spite of the difficulties which have been raised, that the ascription to him of the review of Massey's translation is correct. (2) We may conclude, because of the difficulties, that the anonymous author of the "Literary anecdotes," writing some fifteen years after the event, cannot be considered as offering dependable testimony in this ascription. (3) We may conclude that the author, while in general offering reliable testimony, made one slight slip in speaking of Ovid's *Fasti* instead of Ovid's *Epistles*. Either the second or the third conclusion appears much more probable than the first; and if either is accepted, there is no reason for assigning to Goldsmith the paper in the *Critical review* on Ovid's *Fasti*. The review of Massey may therefore be safely dropped from the Goldsmith canon.

<sup>12</sup> See below, pp. 28-29.

<sup>13</sup> It seems inappropriate to argue here the superiority of the review of Barrett; the two papers can be compared in the standard editions of Goldsmith's works. One obvious point, however, may be made: the seven pages of the review of Massey consist of about six pages of quotation and only about one of original composition; the nine pages of the review of Barrett are almost equally divided between quotation and the reviewer's own writing.

<sup>14</sup> The January number of the *Critical review* would normally have been published about the first of February.

<sup>15</sup> Writing to his brother in Ireland on or before January 13, 1759, he says: "I shall the beginning of next month send over two hundred and fifty books . . ." (*Collected letters*, p. 56).

## "ESSAYS AND CRITICISMS" (1798)

The first serious attempt to gather together Goldsmith's anonymous essays and reviews was made in a three-volume collection of 1798 entitled *Essays and criticisms, by Dr. Goldsmith*. The first volume reprints the essays that Goldsmith himself had brought together in 1765 and 1766; the second and third volumes contain essays from the *British magazine* and the *Westminster magazine* not previously ascribed to Goldsmith, various other papers ascribed to him earlier, and eleven pieces from the *Critical review*, which are presented as "Specimens of criticisms by Dr. Goldsmith, written in the year MDCCLIX."<sup>16</sup> The manner in which the writings in the second and third volumes were supposedly identified is indicated in the preface to Volume II:

The late Mr. THOMAS WRIGHT, Printer, a man of literary observation and experience, had, during his connection with those periodical publications, in which the early works of Dr. GOLDSMITH were originally contained, carefully marked the several compositions of the different writers, as they were delivered to him to print. Being therefore, it was supposed, the only person able to separate the genuine performances of Dr. GOLDSMITH from those of other writers, in these miscellaneous collections, it became the wish of several admirers of the Author of *The Traveller* and *Deserted Village*, that his authentic writings should no longer be blended with either doubtful or spurious pieces. Mr. WRIGHT was therefore recommended and prevailed upon to print the present Selection, which he had just completed at the time of his death.<sup>17</sup>

This statement seems perfectly explicit as to the source of the attributions; but, as R. S. Crane has made apparent, there are serious difficulties in the way of accepting it as entirely reliable: there is no

evidence that Thomas Wright was printer of the *British magazine*; some of the pieces reprinted from that magazine are almost certainly not by Goldsmith; ten essays were taken not from "those periodical publications, in which the early works of Dr. GOLDSMITH were originally contained," but from an earlier collection entitled *The beauties of the magazines*.<sup>18</sup> Since the statement in *Essays and criticisms* cannot thus be wholly relied on, it becomes necessary to re-examine, as Goldsmith's editors have never done, the ascription of the eleven papers from the *Critical review*. The question of Wright's connection with this journal will first be raised, and then the reviews printed as "specimens of criticisms by Dr. Goldsmith" will be examined for indications of his authorship.

The literary antiquarian, John Nichols, offers important testimony concerning Thomas Wright. After describing Wright's business relations with Archibald Hamilton, the publisher of the *Critical review*, Nichols continues:

He [Wright] printed the "Westminster Magazine:" in which he had marked the Writer of every article in a copy which probably still exists. He had in a like manner, when at Mr. Hamilton's, prefixed the names of the Writers in the "Critical Review."<sup>19</sup>

This statement appears to be, at least in part, independent of the one in the preface to *Essays and criticisms*: the *Westminster magazine* and the *Critical review* are named, as they are nowhere in *Essays and criticisms*; and, while the editors of the collection make some attributions from the *British magazine* that are almost certainly wrong, Nichols does not mention any connection between Wright and that periodical. The extent of Nichols' inde-

<sup>16</sup> III, 167. The reviews are printed at the end of Vol. III.

<sup>17</sup> II, viii-ix.

<sup>18</sup> See *New essays by Oliver Goldsmith*, ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago, 1927), pp. xii-xv.

<sup>19</sup> *Literary anecdotes of the eighteenth century*, III (London, 1812), 399 n.

pendence, however, is not clear; for immediately following the sentences given above, he continues: "In a Preface to the Second Volume of 'Essays and Criticisms by Dr. Goldsmith, 1798,' Mr. Seward says . . ." and goes on to quote the relevant passage. It should be noted, too, that he makes no claim to having seen the marked copies of the *Westminster magazine* and the *Critical review*. Nichols thus seems to supply evidence for Wright's connection with the *Critical review*, but his testimony cannot be taken as a guaranty of the correctness of the attributions from that periodical made in *Essays and criticisms*. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to the reviews themselves to see what internal evidence there is for admitting them into the Goldsmith canon.

Of the eleven<sup>20</sup> reviews reprinted in *Essays and criticisms*, only four exhibit any clear signs of Goldsmith's hand. These are, in the order in which they appeared in the *Critical review*, (1) the review, discussed in the preceding section of this study, of Barrett's translation of Ovid's *Epistles*, (2) the review of *The dramatic works of Mr. Philip Massinger*, (3) the review of the prose part of *The genuine remains in verse and prose of Mr. Samuel Butler*, and (4) the review of William Dunkin's *An epistle to the Earl of Chesterfield*.

I. The criticism of Barrett, which appeared in the *Critical review* for January, 1759,<sup>21</sup> contains several parallels in thought with Goldsmith's known writing. The review begins thus:

The praise which is every day lavished upon Virgil, Horace, or Ovid, is often no more than an indirect method the critic takes to compliment his own discernment. Their works have

<sup>20</sup> In *Essays and criticisms* the reviews number only ten. But in the *Critical review* the verse and prose parts of *The genuine remains in verse and prose of Mr. Samuel Butler* were reviewed separately, in the numbers for July and September, 1759, respectively; and these two reviews are discussed separately below.

<sup>21</sup> VII, 31-39 (*Works*, IV, 325-33).

long been considered as models of beauty; to praise them now is only to shew the conformity of our taste to theirs: it tends not to advance their reputation, but to promote our own.

Goldsmith on at least three subsequent occasions gives the same motive to critics who praise writers of established reputation. First, in a paper entitled "The futility of criticism" he treats the idea thus briefly:

Established reputation is always sure of the critics indulgence, his greatest antipathy is ever levelled at rising genius; he praises the one to shew the rectitude of his taste, and condemns the other to prove the delicacy of his discernment.<sup>22</sup>

He develops the theme with reference to critics of Homer in his review of Kedington's *Critical dissertations upon the Iliad*:

The praise bestowed on a writer of established reputation, is perhaps more frequently designed as a compliment to ourselves than the author: we only shew the rectitude of our own taste by a standard allowed already to be just: what advantages the public are to gain by praising Homer at this time of day, we know not; Mr. Kedington may reap some, since all must allow he has taste enough to relish those beauties which most men of taste have either relished, or pretended to relish before.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, he touches upon the same idea in one of his Chinese Letters:

The truth is, we deliver those criticisms in public which are supposed to be best calculated not to do justice to the author, but to impress others with an opinion of our superior discernment.<sup>24</sup>

Possibly more convincing evidence of Goldsmith's authorship appears in the re-

<sup>22</sup> *Weekly magazine*, No. III, January 12, 1760, p. 61. For Goldsmith's authorship of this paper see *MP*, XXXII (1935), 286-90.

<sup>23</sup> *Critical review*, IX (January, 1760), 11. For Goldsmith's authorship of this piece see R. S. Crane, *Philological quarterly*, XIII (1934), 21-29.

<sup>24</sup> *Citizen of the world*, Letter XCVII (*Works*, III, 358).

viewer's attitude toward the state of the "republic of letters" in his own day, which he thus describes most fully in the eighteenth paragraph of the review:

We have of late seen the republic of letters crowded with some, who have no other pretensions to applause but industry, who have no other merit but that of reading many books, and making long quotations; these we have heard extolled by sympathetic dunces, and have seen them carry off the rewards of genius; while others, who should have been born in better days, felt all the want of poverty, and the agonies of contempt. Who then that has a regard for the public, for the literary honours of our country, for the figure we shall one day make among posterity, that would not chuse to see such humbled as are possessed only of talents that might have made good coblers, had fortune turn'd them to trade.

These sentences might almost be taken as a summary of the chapters entitled "Of rewarding genius in England" and "Of the marks of literary decay in France and England" in Goldsmith's *Enquiry into the present state of polite learning in Europe* (probably completed shortly before this review was written), and they closely parallel the ironic exhortation with which he concludes the book:

If, then, there ever comes a time when Taste is so far depraved among us that critics shall load every work of genius with unnecessary comment, and quarter their empty performances with the substantial merit of an author, both for subsistence and applause; if there comes a time when censure shall speak in storms, but praise be whispered in the breeze, while real excellence often finds shipwreck in either; if there be a time when the Muse shall seldom be heard, . . . while lazy compilations supply the place of original thinking; should there ever be such a time, may succeeding critics . . . say, that such a period bears no resemblance to the present age!<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Works*, III, 528.

There are a few other remarks in the review which are suggestive of Goldsmith's authorship. Dryden's poverty, mentioned in the third paragraph, is referred to by Goldsmith on three occasions;<sup>26</sup> the sentences on "comment and scholia" in the same paragraph are typical of Goldsmith's contemptuous attitude toward critical commentary in the *Enquiry* and elsewhere;<sup>27</sup> the distinction in the fifth paragraph between the sentiment and the expression of an author to be translated is made by him in an earlier review;<sup>28</sup> and the remarks in the concluding paragraph on Ovid's lack of power in description parallel the judgments on the Roman poet passed by Goldsmith on both an earlier and a later occasion.<sup>29</sup>

This, then, is the internal evidence for ascribing the review of Barrett to Goldsmith. Although the paper contains no striking parallels of expression with his known works, the number and variety of the parallels in thought appear sufficient to make the ascription a probable one.<sup>30</sup>

2. The one-page criticism of *The dramatic works of Mr. Philip Massinger* in the *Critical review* for July, 1759,<sup>31</sup> con-

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 157; III, 315, 347.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 471-72, 475, 478, 528; II, 360, 397-98; IV, 380; V, 257.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 319-20.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 243-44; I, 98.

<sup>30</sup> There is a bit of evidence which, if accepted as dependable, would give the authorship to Smollett. John Nichols, writing in 1812, says: "Smollett, in one of his Critical Reviews, says of a Mr. Barrett, who had translated Ovid's Epistles, that 'though he might be an excellent schoolmaster, he had, however, no pretensions to taste'" (*Literary anecdotes*, III, 346 n.). But in this casual remark—he makes it merely for the sake of the quotation it contains—Nichols does not seem to be making a serious attribution of authorship; rather he appears to be assuming that the paper is by Smollett because it appeared "in one of his Critical Reviews." Against this evidence may be placed the possibility, already discussed, that the author of the "Literary anecdotes" of 1774 was referring to the criticism of Barrett as Goldsmith's.

<sup>31</sup> VIII, 86-87. This review is omitted from Gibbs's edition, though apparently not because he had any doubts concerning Goldsmith's authorship (see *Works*, IV, 455 n.; V, 413).

tains certain judgments and attitudes which are sufficiently distinctive to indicate Goldsmith's authorship. The reviewer speaks of Shakespeare as "a man whose beauties seem rather the result of chance than design; who, while he laboured to satisfy his audience with monsters and mummary, seemed to throw in his inimitable beauties as trifles into the bargain." In the *Enquiry* Goldsmith similarly moves against the current of contemporary Shakespeare idolatry:

I admire the beauties of this great father of our stage as much as they deserve, but could wish, for the honour of our country, and for his honour too, that many of his scenes were forgotten. A man blind of one eye should always be painted in profile.<sup>32</sup>

In passing judgment on the plays of Massinger, the reviewer gives a clear indication of the nature of his critical principles:

Nothing less than a genius like Shakespear's could make plays wrote to the taste of those times, pleasing now. . . . Massinger, however, was not such a man; he seldom rises to any pitch of sublimity. . . . His performances are all crowded with incident, but want character, the genuine mark of genius in a dramatic poet. In our days it is probable he might make a very judicious poet; he might preserve every unity, prepare his incidents, work up his plot, and give us a piece as coolly correct, or as unfeelingly boisterous, as the best tragedy-maker of them all.

This same preference for genius and sublimity as opposed to the correctness attained by following the rules appears throughout Goldsmith's critical writing, underlying, as it does, his belief that "the merit of every work is determined, not from the number of its faults, but of its beauties";<sup>33</sup> it is possibly given most com-

<sup>32</sup> *Works*, III, 519, and cf. the remarks of Dr. Primrose in *The Vicar of Wakefield*, chap. xviii (*Works*, I, 146).

<sup>33</sup> *Critical review*, IX, 12, and cf. *Works*, I, 130; II, 375; IV, 353.

plete expression in his review, published in 1757, of Home's *Douglas, a tragedy*:

A mechanically exact adherence to all the rules of the drama is more the business of industry than of genius. Theatrical lawgivers rather teach the ignorant where to censure, than the poet how to write. If sublimity, sentiment, and passion, give warmth and life and expression to the whole, we can the more easily dispense with the rules of the Stagyrite; but if languor, affectation, and the false sublime, are substituted for these, an observance of all the precepts of the ancients will prove but a poor compensation.<sup>34</sup>

A further judgment of Massinger's plays is even more indicative of Goldsmith's authorship:

A poet, whose works have been forgotten so soon after publication, when his language was modern, and his humour new, must surely cut but an indifferent figure, brought back to light again in an age when his diction is become antiquated, and the highest sallies of his humour forced, for want of models to compare them by.

The critical principle suggested in the last part of this sentence—that works cannot be judged by universal standards because the models which authors imitate vary from age to age—though not a principle which finds frequent expression in the criticism of the sixth decade of the eighteenth century, is one which Goldsmith enforces in the *Enquiry*. It is impossible, he points out, to determine the relative worth of the ancients and the moderns, for the two have "copied from different originals, described the manners of different ages."<sup>35</sup> And not every age only, he tells us, but every country as well must have its own standard of taste:

. . . it cannot be expected that our works of taste, which imitate our peculiar manners, can please those that are unacquainted with the originals themselves. Though our descriptions and characters are drawn from nature,

<sup>34</sup> *Works*, IV, 251.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 530.

yet they may appear exaggerated, or faintly copied, to those who, unacquainted with the peculiarities of our island, have no standard by which to make the comparison.<sup>36</sup>

Goldsmith then proceeds to illustrate his argument with examples of dramatic humor: "Sir John Falstaff, with all the merry men of Eastcheap, are entirely of England, and please the English alone."

In addition to these distinctive critical positions, there are a few passing references in the review which serve as further signs of Goldsmith's hand; there is an allusion to "school-philosophy, the foe of common sense";<sup>37</sup> the lack of patronage and the use of Latin for sermons during the Elizabethan period are touched upon;<sup>38</sup> and mention is made of "a set of readers, who being half critics, and half antiquarians, will be apt to regard what may be displeasing to others, as beauties."<sup>39</sup>

3. In the review of the prose part of *The genuine remains in verse and prose of Mr. Samuel Butler*, published in the *Critical review* for September, 1759,<sup>40</sup> the parallels with Goldsmith's writings are not very numerous, but two of them are very close verbally. At the end of the second paragraph the reviewer makes the following remark about the prose style of Butler's time:

.... this sententious manner of the last age, somewhat resembles Gothic architecture, where the eye of the spectator is presented with a number of parts, each highly finished, and separately pretty, but which, however, diminish the effect of the whole.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 532. This relativistic aspect of Goldsmith's critical theory also finds expression in his review of Kedington's *Critical dissertations upon the Iliad of Homer*, in the *Critical review*, IX (January, 1760), 10-19.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Works*, III, 476, 478-79, 488.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, V, 308.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, III, 519, and the review of Kedington's *Critical dissertations*.

<sup>40</sup> VIII, 208-12 (*Works*, IV, 377-81).

In an essay entitled "On wit" published only about three weeks after the review of Butler, Goldsmith makes a very similar comparison of prose style and Gothic architecture—and from "separately pretty" on, in almost the same words:

In our most applauded productions there is scarce a sentence which is not loaded with unnecessary ornament, which, though it may add grace to a period, generally disunites the force of a paragraph. The attention, as in Gothic architecture, is split upon a number of minute elegances, which, though each is separately pretty, diminish the force of the whole.<sup>41</sup>

The other sentence which is closely paralleled in Goldsmith's writing occurs in the third paragraph of the review: "Every wrong disposition of literary honours, Butler seems to have thought a negative insult upon genius. . . ." The striking phrase at the end of this sentence occurs in the *Enquiry*, where Goldsmith is similarly discussing the misapplication of literary rewards: "Every encouragement given to stupidity, when known to be such, is also a negative insult upon genius."<sup>42</sup>

A few other passages in the review help to fix Goldsmith's authorship. The allusion to the indolence of readers—"most readers now take up books merely to be idle"—is paralleled earlier in a review and later in the *Bee*.<sup>43</sup> Goldsmith, like the reviewer, uses Butler, Dante, and Cassandra as examples of writers who have suffered distress.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the reviewer's exclamation, "Were such a number of original thoughts in possession of a German commentator, what folios might not be the re-

<sup>41</sup> *Bee*, No. III, October 20, 1759 (*Works*, II, 359). The sentences quoted are from a part of the essay not translated from Voltaire.

<sup>42</sup> *Works*, III, 502.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 255; II, 397.

<sup>44</sup> On Butler see *ibid.*, III, 315, 347, and *Collected letters*, p. 46; on Dante, *Works*, III, 162, 480, 512; on Cassandra, *ibid.*, p. 315.

sult of his speculations," is reminiscent of Goldsmith's remarks on German scholars in the *Enquiry*:

.... they begin at the wrong end, I mean by being commentators. .... But guilty of a fault too common to great readers, they write through volumes, while they do not think through a page. .... Were angels to write books, they never would write folios.<sup>45</sup>

4. The review of William Dunkin's *An epistle to the Right Hon. Philip Earl of Chesterfield* in the *Critical review* for March, 1760,<sup>46</sup> contains only one significant parallel with Goldsmith's writings, but it alone appears sufficient for determining the authorship. Toward the end of the review there occurs this passage:

There is scarcely a trifling city or university in Europe which has not its great men; characters, who are taught by adulation, to fancy themselves figuring in the republic of letters, and leaving monuments of their merit to remote posterity. If there should happen to be two of this character in the same city, the compliments they mutually bestow on each other are pleasant enough: they attempt to raise each other's reputation by mutual flattery, and establish their little dominion within the circle of all their acquaintance.

The reviewer then goes on to tell a story of a traveler who, in passing through Burgos in Spain, is told about "the admirable Brandellius" and "the ingenious Mogusius," both "known all over the world" because "Brandellius has wrote a most sublime panegyric on Mogusius" and Mogusius "has written an excellent poem in praise of Brandellius."

A few months earlier, in a paper entitled "On the instability of worldly grandeur," Goldsmith had given a similar account of "great men," which begins in almost the same words as the passage quoted from the review:

<sup>45</sup> Works, III, 483; for a mention of "German comment" see *Collected letters*, p. 38.

<sup>46</sup> IX, 232-35 (Works, IV, 403-6).

There is scarce a village in Europe, and not one university, that is not thus furnished with its little great men. The head of a petty corporation . . . ; the puny pedant . . . ; the rhymer who makes smooth verses . . . ; all equally fancy themselves walking forward to immortality, and desire the crowd behind them to look on.<sup>47</sup>

Again, in a Chinese Letter published a few months after the paper in the *Critical review*, Goldsmith closely parallels the passage given from the review:

I have visited many countries, and have been in cities without number, yet never did I enter a town which could not produce ten or twelve of those little great men; all fancying themselves known to the rest of the world, and complimenting each other upon their extensive reputation. It is amusing enough when two of those domestic prodigies of learning mount the stage of ceremony, and give and take praise from each other. I have been present when a German doctor, for having pronounced a panegyric upon a certain monk, was thought the most ingenious man in the world; till the monk soon after divided this reputation by returning the compliment. . . .<sup>48</sup>

On the basis of internal evidence alone, then, four out of eleven—slightly over a third—of the reviews reprinted in *Essays and criticisms* seem quite probably to be by Goldsmith. Since this would be a surprisingly high proportion for guessing and since there is no reason to think that Thomas Wright made the selection on the basis of internal evidence, it seems likely that he had some kind of special knowledge concerning Goldsmith's contributions to the *Critical review*. Consequently, other reviews in *Essays and criticisms* which, on the basis of internal evidence, afford no arguments for or against his authorship may be tentatively retained in the Goldsmith canon, though their posi-

<sup>47</sup> Bee, No. VI, November 10, 1759 (Works, II, 416-17).

<sup>48</sup> *Citizen of the world*, Letter LXXIV (Works, III 281). This one parallel is noted by Gibbs.

tion there cannot be considered secure. Such reviews appear to be those of the following six books: (1) Marriott's *Female conduct* (January, 1759); (2) the same author's *Twentieth epistle of Horace to his book, modernized* (July); (3) Goddard's translation of Guicciardini's *History of Italy* (August); (4) *The works of Mr. William Hawkins* (August); (5) *Jemima and Louisa*<sup>49</sup> (August); and (6) *A review of the works of the Rev. W. Hawkins* (March, 1760).

This leaves one attribution still to be discussed: the review of the verse part of *The genuine remains in verse and prose of Mr. Samuel Butler*, which appeared in the *Critical review* for July, 1759.<sup>50</sup> Although it might be presumed that this first review, on the verse part, and the review two months later on the prose portion would be by the same hand, there is fairly strong evidence that such is not the case. The reviewer at the end of the first part calls attention to a continuation:

Having thus, we hope, given no unsatisfactory account of this curious collection, so far as regards the poetical part of it, we are obliged to defer the prose part, in which Butler will appear with equal, if not superior, advantages to a future opportunity.

In the second part of the review, however, Goldsmith makes no mention at all of the first; the only indication that he is writing a continuation appears in the heading. More important, the second part does not fulfil the promise that "Butler will appear

<sup>49</sup> The attitude taken toward "modern romance" by the reviewer of this work might seem to be indicative of Goldsmith's authorship, but the same attitude appears far too frequently in the *Critical review* to serve as the basis for a satisfactory argument. Possibly a better—though not a strong—indication of his authorship appears in the use of a single word. The reviewer says, "What need we tell as how the young *lover* runs mad . . ." (*Works*, IV, 387); with this may be compared a sentence from Goldsmith's review of another novel two years earlier: "The story contains the adventures of a couple of true *lovers* . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 275).

<sup>50</sup> VIII, 1-10 (*Works*, IV, 368-77).

with equal, if not superior, advantages"; indeed, the treatment of him in the two parts is strikingly different. In the first part he is the object of fatuous praise and exaggerated comparisons of a kind that finds no parallel in Goldsmith's critical writings: "we see him [Butler] join the humour of Lucian to the philosophy of Plato, and unite the virtue of Socrates with the wit of Aristophanes"; before the publication of the *Remains*, "Swift could, with some appearance of justice, have disputed with Butler the palm of wit, humour, and observation of life," but "the question must be now . . . decided in Butler's favour"; Butler's "Satyr upon the weakness and misery of man" is "perhaps the finest and the justest satyr that any language can produce";<sup>51</sup> "Mr. Pope has nothing in all his works more spirited and musical" than a passage from another poem. In the second review, while Goldsmith values Butler's writing highly, he is concerned more with determining his author's specific merits and defects than with heaping praise upon him. In the only comparative evaluation of writers in the second review Butler is found not to equal Bruyère as a writer of characters, though he is "not inferior to" Theophrastus.

Another reason for doubting Goldsmith's authorship of the first review is that it evinces a greater knowledge of Butler's period than from his original works there is any reason to believe that Goldsmith possessed. Thus the reviewer can make the following suggestion concerning one of Butler's poems:

If we might hazard a conjecture, the poet might allegorically have designed to satirize some of the committees of parliament, that sate upon the estates of the king's party, and compounded with their owners. Those com-

<sup>51</sup> In his anthology *The beauties of English poetry* (1767), although Goldsmith includes satires by Swift, Pope, Young, and Johnson, he does not include this poem by Butler—or any other poem by him.

mittees sat in different parts, not only of the kingdom but of the city.

His remarks on Cromwell in the same paragraph show a similar specialized knowledge.

The only sign of Goldsmith's hand in the first review is a reference to the poverty and neglect suffered by Butler, a reference also made by Goldsmith in the second review and elsewhere in his writing; but that this is a very fallible sign is indicated on a later occasion by Goldsmith himself: "the names of Spenser and Otway, Butler and Dryden, are every day mentioned as a national reproach."<sup>53</sup> Since there is, then, reason to believe that the two reviews are by different authors and since there is independent evidence that the second was written by Goldsmith and the first was not, the review of the verse portion of Butler's *Remains* cannot be safely retained in the Goldsmith canon.

One question concerning the review remains unanswered: How can we, if we accept Thomas Wright's attributions as probably reliable in all other cases, explain his error in this one instance? Although no certain answer can be given, the explanation probably is that someone, knowing or being told that Goldsmith wrote the second part, assumed without carefully comparing the two that he wrote the first as well. If Wright, contrary to what the editor of *Essays and criticisms* and Nichols imply, did not mark the contributors of all the articles in the *Critical review*, then he may have been responsible; if he did, then an editorial assistant may have been to blame, either because he made a wrong assumption or because Wright was not sufficiently explicit in his directions. Although we shall probably never know the exact circumstances, we can accept the fact that *Essays and criti-*

*cisms* is probably wrong in this one ascription without necessarily discrediting its reliability concerning Goldsmith's other contributions to the *Critical review*.<sup>54</sup>

#### PRIOR'S ATTRIBUTIONS

Although the eleven reviews in *Essays and criticisms* were presented merely as "specimens of criticisms by Dr. Goldsmith," no further attempt was made to identify his contributions to the *Critical review* until James Prior's biography of Goldsmith appeared in 1837.<sup>55</sup> Prior, while accepting without question all the attributions in *Essays and criticisms*, indicates why he believes the list to be incomplete:

.... it will be observed there is a blank between the months of January and July, yet as his [Goldsmith's] necessities were urgent and no other literary employment can be traced to him at this time, we may be assured he was not idle.

Prior then gives a good statement of the way in which previously neglected pieces can be identified:

Criticism indeed cannot always be certainly traced to the actual writer; but when he is known to have contributed to a work without fixed purpose of concealment, and where in conjunction with style generally we find his favourite phrases, allusions and even sentiments as seen not in one but several of his

<sup>53</sup> This explanation, however, may raise doubts about other reviews from *Essays and criticisms* which have been tentatively retained in the canon. May not the compiler, knowing that Goldsmith reviewed *The works of Mr. William Hawkins*, have assumed that he also wrote the paper on the book which replied to that review. *A review of the works of the Rev. W. Hawkins?* Or, since there is no internal evidence for Goldsmith's authorship of either review, may not the compiler have known that he wrote the second and assumed that he wrote the first as well? The same questions may be asked about the reviews of Marriot's *Female conduct* and of the same author's poem attacking the first review. *The twentieth episile of Horace to his book, modernized.* There seems to be at present no way of settling these doubts.

<sup>54</sup> For Prior's additions to the canon see *Life*, I, 316-18.

writings, there will be little difficulty in fixing the authorship with a great degree of precision.

By applying this method Prior arrives without hesitation at very definite conclusions:

... among other papers which are doubtful, and therefore not noticed here, the following appear certainly to be his: on Church's edition of Spenser, in the February number; Langhorne's translation of the Death of Adonis, and the foreign article [on Goguet's *De l'origine des loix, des arts, et des sciences*], in March; Ward's Oratory, in April; the Orphan of China, in May; Dr. Young's Conjectures on Original Composition, Formey's Philosophical Miscellanies, Van Egmont's and Heyman's Travels through Parts of Europe and Asia Minor, Montesquieu's Miscellaneous Pieces,—in June.

These attributions have been accepted without question by Goldsmith's subsequent editors.

As a specimen of his method of identifying Goldsmith's papers in the *Critical review*, Prior examines the criticism of Van Egmont and Heyman's *Travels*, showing that the portion of it on the utility of a journey to the East by a philosophic traveler may be taken as the reflection of a design which occupied Goldsmith's mind many years and that *Citizen of the world*, Letter CVIII, contains "the substance and even the words" of this passage from the review. Although the argument here is not conclusive (the parallel between the review and the *Citizen* paper is not, on the verbal level at least, so close as Prior suggests), the evidence is probably strong enough to justify the inclusion of the review in the Goldsmith canon.

Unfortunately, for the eight other reviews which "appear certainly to be his" Prior offers no evidence at all; instead he merely presents his character as an expert witness:

It would be tedious to enumerate the minute species of evidence serving to identify each; an editor,<sup>55</sup> in the close and laborious examination incumbent upon him to make of the writings of his principal, will discover much that must escape the notice of the casual reader. . . .

Since, then, these eight reviews have been accepted as Goldsmith's merely on Prior's testimony and since other ascriptions made by him are either wrong or doubtful,<sup>56</sup> it seems necessary to examine the reviews and to state the grounds for or against admitting each one into the Goldsmith canon.

1. The review of Church's edition of Spenser's *Faerie queene* in the *Critical review* for February, 1759,<sup>57</sup> offers few similarities with Goldsmith's writings. The reviewer shows some hostility to critics and to the critical apparatus of editors, though his statement that Church "merits all the praise due to an exact and cautious editor" is possibly more equivocal than one would expect Goldsmith to be. The remark that "the history of one poet might serve with . . . little variation for that of any other" bears a slight resemblance to Goldsmith's comments in his lives of Voltaire and of Parnell on the difficulty in writing biographies of men of letters.<sup>58</sup> Finally, the reviewer in discussing Church's life of Spenser mentions the poet's distress, a fact referred to by Goldsmith in the *Citizen of the world*.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Prior's edition of Goldsmith's works, published in the same year as the *Life*, reprints six of the nine reviews (those of Formey, Montesquieu, and Van Egmont and Heyman are omitted), but it offers no evidence concerning authorship.

<sup>56</sup> E.g., it was Prior who first ascribed essays in the *Literary magazine* to Goldsmith (see *Life*, I, 232-36). That Prior was not particularly critical in his use of internal evidence appears from his statement that the selection of papers from the *Critical review* in *Essays and criticisms* "from internal evidence is correct as far as it goes" (*Life*, I, 316).

<sup>57</sup> VII, 103-6 (*Works*, IV, 333-37).

<sup>58</sup> *Works*, IV, 3 and 157; and cf. *MP*, XXXII (1935), 294.

<sup>59</sup> Letter LXXXIV (*Works*, III, 315).

These passages from the review, which at best can be taken as very inadequate signs of Goldsmith's hand, are balanced by two other passages which point away from his authorship. The reviewer concludes a paragraph in praise of Spenser, "our old favourite,"<sup>60</sup> with the statement that "the imagination of his reader leaves reason behind, pursues the tale, without considering the allegory, and upon the whole, is charmed without instruction." The attitude here differs markedly from Goldsmith's condemnation of "indolent readers, who turn to an author with the design rather of killing than improving their time" and who are "scared at the serious face of instruction."<sup>61</sup> A greater dissimilarity to Goldsmith's settled opinions appears in the following passage:

.... many of our modern writers, such as Gray, Akenside, and others, seem to have studied his [Spenser's] manner with the utmost attention; from him their compounded epithets, and solemn flow of numbers, seem evidently borrowed; and the verses of Spenser may, perhaps, one day be considered as the standard of English poetry. It were happy indeed, if his beauties were the only object of modern imitation; but many of his words, justly fallen into disuse . . . , have been of late revived. . . .

Although Goldsmith would no doubt have joined the reviewer in his condemnation of the revival of antiquated diction, he would certainly not have agreed that Spenser's "beauties" were being imitated by modern poets in their "compounded epithets, and solemn flow of numbers," for he considered these things as among the most objectionable features of contemporary poetry. He thus treats them in the *Enquiry*:

<sup>60</sup> Gibbs (*Works*, IV, 334 n.) compares the estimate of Spenser in the review with that in the essay "A poetical scale" from the *Literary magazine*. There is, however, little reason to believe that Goldsmith wrote the essay (see above, n. 8).

<sup>61</sup> *Works*, IV, 255, and cf. *ibid.*, p. 378, and II, 397.

The solemnity worn by many of our modern writers, is, I fear, often the mask of dulness. . . . It were to be wished, therefore, that we no longer found pleasure with the inflated style. . . . We should now dispense with loaded epithet, and dressing up trifles with dignity.<sup>62</sup>

Elsewhere in the *Enquiry* he condemns as an "erroneous innovation" the introduction of "a disgusting solemnity of manner into our poetry,"<sup>63</sup> and in the *Citizen of the world* he mentions "bloated and compound epithet" as the distinguishing feature of modern poetry.<sup>64</sup>

Since, then, the review of Church's edition of the *Faerie queene* shows no marked similarities with Goldsmith's writings and since on two points it is in sharp disagreement with them, there seems to be no good reason for believing it to be Goldsmith's.

2. The review of Langhorne's *The death of Adonis: a pastoral elegy, from the Greek of Bion* in the March number of the *Critical review*<sup>65</sup> seems to contain only one parallel of any importance with Goldsmith's writings: the reviewer's ridicule of modern elegiac poets toward the end of his paper is slightly reminiscent of the remarks on the elegy in the *Vicar* and in the *Citizen of the world*.<sup>66</sup> The similarities are not very close, however, and one wonders how Prior could have been so confident in ascribing the piece to Goldsmith. But there is another kind of evidence, almost certainly unknown to Prior, which makes Goldsmith's authorship probable. With the exception of the quotations from the book under review, fully two-thirds of the paper is directly translated or paraphrased

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 516.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 514.

<sup>64</sup> Letter XCVII (*Works*, III, 358). Goldsmith also condemns the use of epithet in *Works*, I, 98, and III, 512, and in *New essays*, p. 114.

<sup>65</sup> VII, 260-63 (*Works*, IV, 338-41).

<sup>66</sup> *Works*, I, 139, 140, and III, 382.

without acknowledgment from the article "Elégie" in the fifth volume (1755) of Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*. Now by the time this review was written, Goldsmith was certainly acquainted with the French collection, for he refers to it in the *Enquiry*,<sup>67</sup> and soon afterward it was to become for a time his most regular source. Extensive borrowings were made from it in an article very probably by Goldsmith in the *Critical review* for the following month (April, 1759); in October and November he used it for no less than nine papers in his periodical, the *Bee*; and early in 1760 it served as his source on four further occasions.<sup>68</sup> What is more striking, although seven volumes of the *Encyclopédie* were available in 1759, eleven of these unacknowledged pilferings were from the same fifth volume in which the article "Elégie" appears. It seems unlikely that of the small number of writers for the *Critical review*<sup>69</sup> more than one would have turned to the *Encyclopédie* as a source for unacknowledged borrowing—and particularly to the fifth volume. Goldsmith's authorship of the review of Langhorne may consequently be asserted with a fair degree of confidence.

3. In the "Foreign article" on Goguet's *De l'origine des loix, des arts, et des sciences* in the *Critical review* for March, 1759,<sup>70</sup> only two passages seem to offer any evidence bearing on Goldsmith's authorship. "There is," the reviewer tells us at the beginning of his paper, "a prettiness, a neatness, and symmetry of parts in the plan of most French books, which we admire, even while we hold the abilities of

the author in contempt." He then continues in a style reminiscent of Goldsmith with a comparison of the English and the French writer:

Energy, accuracy, and industry would seem to characterize the one; beauty, and elegance of drapery, with a certain happiness of design, are the distinguishing marks of the other. By the former a thought is scrupulously examined in every light; by the latter it is placed with little trouble in the most striking. . . . Here a writer is strained and tortured into all the distortions of the Pythian goddess, to utter what he knows; there he talks with a decisive dignity and a graceful eloquence, upon subjects of which he is totally ignorant. . . .

Beside this may be placed a passage from the chapter entitled "The polite learning of England and France incapable of comparison" in the *Enquiry*:

Yet that excellence [of English and French writers] which now excites the admiration of Europe, served at that period of which I am speaking [the reigns of Queen Anne and Louis XIV] only to promote envy in the respective writers of those two countries. They both took every method to depreciate the merit of each other; the French seldom mentioned the English but with disrespect. . . . The English, on the other hand, regarded the French as triflers, accused the flimsy texture of their style, and the false brilliancy of their sentiments. . . . Europe, however, regarded the contest with impartiality, and the debate seems at last determined. Their writings are allowed to have more taste, ours more truth. We are allowed the honour of striking out sentiments, they of dressing them in the most pleasing form.<sup>71</sup>

This passage throws light on the review of Goguet in two ways. First, the kind of detraction of French authors indulged in by the reviewer is not, according to Goldsmith, anything new in 1759 but goes back to the early years of the century. Second, the comparison in the *Enquiry* between

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 497-98.

<sup>68</sup> See R. S. Crane and Arthur Friedman, "Goldsmith and the *Encyclopédie*," *Times literary supplement*, May 11, 1933, p. 331.

<sup>69</sup> A writer in that periodical for October, 1757 (IV, 333), speaks of "five persons concerned in writing the Critical Review." How many contributors there were a year and a half later is not known.

<sup>70</sup> VII, 270-74 (*Works*, IV, 342-47).

<sup>71</sup> *Works*, III, 531-32.

the "taste" of the French and the "truth" of the English is not unlike the more elaborate comparison in the review, though Goldsmith may seem less inclined than the reviewer to weight the balance in favor of the English. The comparison between Goldsmith and the reviewer is further complicated by the fact that, while in the *Citizen of the world*, Letter XX, Goldsmith severely criticizes those who generalize about the defects of French writers, he himself in reviewing Brookes's *Natural history* for both the *Critical review* and the *Monthly review* contrasts English and French scientific writers in a manner detrimental to the latter.<sup>72</sup>

The second important passage from the review is concerned with the plan of Goguet's work:

When we first set about reading our historian, when we perused his preface, where he professes to give an accurate view of facts, as first principles; to trace the origin of laws, arts and sciences, in the manner most agreeable to those principles; and lastly, to connect this variety of different objects in so regular a chain, as at one glance to shew their mutual influence, we doubted not but the wish of our great Lord Verulam was accomplished.

After thus giving tacit approval to the design, the reviewer goes on to criticize the execution of it. But from Goldsmith we might have expected an objection not only to the execution of the design but equally to the design itself, for it would seem to illustrate one of the errors which, according to Goldsmith in the *Enquiry*, have

<sup>72</sup> *Critical review*, XVI (August, 1763), 147: "The French have ever had a way of teaching the sciences peculiar to themselves, sprightly, talkative, and entertaining; their manner rather teaches us to love the sciences than to understand them . . ."; *Monthly review*, XXIX (October, 1763), 285: "Readers accustomed to the flowing manner of the French Naturalists, will not, perhaps, relish the drier descriptions of our English Historian. A Frenchman, for instance, would compare an hen with her chickens, to a Legislator at the head of a rising colony, while the tyrant kite is drawn as aiming at their sacred lives and liberties. . . ."

tended to bring about a decline in French polite learning:

The writers of this country have also of late fallen into a method of considering every part of art and science as arising from simple principles. The success of Montesquieu, and one or two more, has induced all the subordinate ranks of genius into vicious imitation. . . . Thus an universal system rises from a partial representation of the question; a whole is concluded from a part; a book appears entirely new, and the fancy-built fabric is styled for a short time very ingenious.<sup>73</sup>

This argument, however, cannot be considered conclusive proof that Goldsmith did not write the article on Goguet; and since the style and content of the first passage offer some indications of his hand, we may well conclude that the evidence as a whole is too meager to make a final determination of authorship possible.

4. There would seem to be little doubt that the review of Ward's *A system of oratory* in the *Critical review* for April, 1759,<sup>74</sup> is by Goldsmith. Like the paper on Langhorne's translation of Bion of the month before, it makes extensive unacknowledged borrowings from the fifth volume of the *Encyclopédie*; about half of the long third paragraph is translated from D'Alembert's article "Elocution," and part of the remaining portion of the third paragraph and most of the fourth paragraph are translated from Voltaire's article, "Eloquence." Now some seven months later in writing a paper entitled "Of eloquence" in the seventh number of the *Bee*, Goldsmith similarly turned to the *Encyclopédie* and made extensive borrowings from the same two articles, in some places translating the same passages as those used for the review;<sup>75</sup> and in Janu-

<sup>73</sup> *Works*, III, 497.

<sup>74</sup> VII, 367-69 (*Works*, IV, 347-50).

<sup>75</sup> The borrowings in both the review and the *Bee* are shown by Joseph E. Brown in *MP*, XXIII (1926), 273-75. Gibbs notes the similarities between the two

ary, 1760, he returned to the article "Eloquence" to translate a passage for a paper in the *Weekly magazine*.<sup>76</sup>

There is a small amount of additional evidence of Goldsmith's authorship. In both his own writing and in the passages he chose to translate the reviewer shows his hostility to critics and the rules. In an original sentence in the second paragraph he thus maintains that "eloquence is more improved by the perusal of great masters, from whose excellencies rules have been afterwards formed, than by an attendance on the lectures of such who pretend to teach the art by rule, more by imitation than precept." With this may be compared both for idea and for expression a passage from the *Enquiry*:

It was observed how some of the most admired poets had copied nature. From these they [the critics] collected dry rules, dignified with long names, and such were obtruded upon the public for their improvement. Common sense would be apt to suggest, that the art might be studied to more advantage, rather by imitation than precept.<sup>77</sup>

5. The review of Murphy's *The orphan of China* in the *Critical review* for May, 1759,<sup>78</sup> offers a number of significant parallels with Goldsmith's writing. The reviewer begins by complaining of the absurd search for novelty among writers<sup>79</sup> and refers to the vogue for everything Chinese;<sup>80</sup> he then proceeds to indicate how improper Chinese writers are as models for imitation:

Of all nations that ever felt the influence of the inspiring goddess, perhaps the Chinese are to be placed in the lowest class; their pro-

pieces without being aware of their source (*Works*, IV, 348, n. 2).

<sup>76</sup> See *MP*, XXXII (1935), 285-86.

<sup>77</sup> *Works*, III, 472.

<sup>78</sup> VII, 434-40 (*Works*, IV, 350-55).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *Works*, II, 359.

<sup>80</sup> On the Chinese vogue cf. *Citizen of the world*, Letter XIV (*Works*, III, 53-55).

ductions are the most phlegmatic that can be imagined. In those pieces of poetry, or novel, translations . . . there is not a single attempt to address the imagination, or influence the passions. . . .

Goldsmith's Chinese philosopher in the *Citizen of the world* takes a very similar attitude toward the writing of his country: Take, Sir, the word of one who is professedly a Chinese . . . that what is palmed upon you daily for an imitation of Eastern writing, no way resembles their manner. . . . In the East, similes are seldom used, and metaphors almost wholly unknown; but in China particularly, the very reverse of what you allude to takes place: a cool phlegmatic method of writing prevails there.<sup>81</sup>

When the reviewer comes to an examination of Murphy's play, his statement that "all enthusiasms are of short continuance; nor is it in the power of genius to keep our sorrows alive through five acts, unless it diversifies the object, or, in every act excites some new and unforeseen distress" is also closely paralleled by the Chinese philosopher in the *Citizen of the world*:

When the play was over, I could not avoid observing, that the persons of the drama appeared in as much distress in the first act as the last. "How is it possible," said I, "to sympathize with them through five long acts? Pity is but a short lived passion."<sup>82</sup>

Again, the reviewer's remark that great writers of tragedy "well knew that we are apt to pity the sufferings of mankind, in proportion as they have fallen from former happiness" resembles a statement made years later by Goldsmith:

When tragedy exhibits to us some great man fallen from his height, and struggling with want and adversity, we feel his situation in the same manner as we suppose he himself must

<sup>81</sup> Letter XXXIII (*Works*, III, 127).

<sup>82</sup> Letter XXI (*Works*, III, 81).

feel, and our pity is increased in proportion to the height from which he fell.<sup>83</sup>

Possibly more significant is the reviewer's statement that "works of genius are not to be judged from the faults to be met with in them, but by the beauties in which they abound," for this same criterion of literary excellence was expressed by Goldsmith on two occasions in the next few months. "The way to acquire lasting esteem," he says in the *Bee*, "is not by the fewness of a writer's faults, but the greatness of his beauties";<sup>84</sup> and he repeats the idea in a review of January, 1760: "But the truth is, the merit of every work is determined, not from the number of its faults, but of its beauties."<sup>85</sup> Finally, after criticizing Murphy for being severe on Voltaire in a letter subjoined to the play, the reviewer thus concludes his paper:

Voltaire is intitled to particular regard from our countrymen, notwithstanding the petulance with which he has treated them on some occasions; for he was certainly the first who opened the eyes of Europe to the excellencies of English poetry.

This statement appears to be a condensation of Goldsmith's more particular statement concerning Voltaire's service to the English in his "Memoirs of M. de Voltaire," probably written a few months before this review was published:

He was the first foreigner who saw the amazing irregular beauties of Shakespeare, gave Milton the character he deserved, spoke of every English poet with some degree of applause, and opened a new page of beauty to the eyes of his astonished countrymen. It is to him we owe that our language has taken place of the Italian among the polite, and that even ladies are taught to admire Milton, Pope, and Otway.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>83</sup> *Works*, I, 399.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 375.

<sup>85</sup> *Critical review*, IX, 12. Cf. also Mr. Burchell's opinion in *The vicar of Wakefield*, chap. xv, that "the reputation of books is raised, not by their freedom from defects, but the greatness of their beauties" (*Works*, I, 130).

<sup>86</sup> *Works*, IV, 26-27.

There is one additional piece of evidence which helps to confirm Goldsmith's authorship of the review. In speaking of translations of Chinese novels the reviewer adds a note saying, "A specimen of this kind will probably appear next season at Mr. Dodsley's, as we are informed"; the reference here seems to be, as has been generally assumed, to Thomas Percy's *Hau Kiou Choaan*, which eventually appeared in 1761. Now it would seem doubtful that knowledge of Percy's unpublished work would have been common to all the writers for the *Critical review*. Goldsmith, however, was clearly in a position to have such knowledge, for, according to Percy's diary, the two had met at Grainger's on February 21, 1759,<sup>87</sup> and they were to meet on at least three further occasions before the time of composition of the paper on Murphy's tragedy.<sup>88</sup>

6. The short criticism of Young's *Conjectures on original composition* in the *Critical review* for June, 1759,<sup>89</sup> is, with the exception of a few remarks on the author's prose style, largely a summary of the work under review, and it consequently offers little evidence concerning authorship. There are, however, a few features of the review which, in light of the certainty with which Prior makes the ascription to Goldsmith, deserve to be considered. The surest sign of Goldsmith's hand might seem to appear in the reviewer's general approval of Young's plea for original composition, for Goldsmith far more than most critics of his day emphasized originality in writing. But

<sup>87</sup> That the conversation ran to unpublished works later to be published by Dodsley may possibly be indicated by the fact that Percy in his diary identifies Goldsmith as "Authr. of y<sup>e</sup> present State of polite Literature in Europe," though the *Enquiry* was not published until more than a month later.

<sup>88</sup> See R. S. Crane, *Modern language notes*, XLVIII (1933), 463.

<sup>89</sup> VII, 483-85 (*Works*, IV, 364-68).

it is easy to bring objections to this argument. In reviewing the book, Goldsmith might be expected to show some enthusiasm for Young's main contention, to discuss his major positions in detail instead of merely summarizing them, and to display his own originality in something more than a discussion of Young's style. A writer without any strongly held critical position of his own, on the other hand, might be expected in reviewing a controversial book by a distinguished author to do just what the present writer does—to praise the author more than his work, to give a fair summary of the book, and to pass judgment on style rather than on content.

Two passages call for brief comment. In the first sentence the reviewer speaks of "Dr. Young, the only survivor of our age of writers"; and Goldsmith similarly looks back to an earlier period as the Augustan age of English literature. But in the *Enquiry* this age is designated as the time of Anne and in the *Bee* as "the reign of Queen Anne, or some years before that period,"<sup>91</sup> while Young's poetical career was barely started during the last two years of the queen. In the same paragraph the reviewer says of Young's style that "wherever he falls short of perfection, his faults are the errors of genius"; and this judgment bears some resemblance to Goldsmith's belief, commented on earlier, that "works of genius are not to be judged from the faults to be met with in them, but by the beauties in which they

<sup>90</sup> *Works*, III, 531; II, 444. There is a possibility that Goldsmith thought of Young as belonging to the age of Anne or an earlier period. Speaking in the *Enquiry* of the patronage of writers when "the great Somers was at the helm," he says: "I have heard an old poet of that glorious age say, that a dinner with his lordship has procured him invitations for the whole week following" (*Works*, III, 503). Percy identifies the old poet as Young, and he may be right even though Young's poetical career by no means goes back to the time when Somers was lord chancellor.

abound."<sup>92</sup> This evidence for Goldsmith's authorship, however, appears too slight and unsatisfactory to make Prior's ascription tenable.

7. The signs of Goldsmith's hand in the review of Formey's *Philosophical miscellanies on various subjects*<sup>93</sup> are few but suggestive. The writer begins with remarks on Formey's life of himself prefaced to the volume:

What he found in his life worthy of thus being made public, is not easy to determine, since all its transactions are comprised in his being bred a divine, in being made professor of eloquence in an university, secretary to a literary society, and having wrote a great many books. There is not, perhaps, in nature a being more fond of flattery than the professor in a college. . . . Though their whole lives may have passed away between the fire-side and the easy chair, yet how have we seen the press sweat with the uninteresting anecdotes of men who did nothing?

The most striking phrase here is "between the fire-side and the easy chair," for Goldsmith uses it in writings both earlier and later than the review—twice in contexts very similar to the present one. It appears first in a letter of 1758 to Robert Bryanton: "Every day do I remember the calm anecdotes of your life, from the fire-side to the easy chair. . . ." It next appears in the remarks on the life of a scholar at the beginning of the "Memoirs of M. de Voltaire" (written by January, 1759):

That life which has been wholly employed in the study, is properly seen only in the author's writings; there is no variety to enter-

<sup>91</sup> *Works*, IV, 353. The figure of "the writers harvest" in the second paragraph of the review closely parallels in expression, though not in sentiment, a passage from the *Enquiry* (*ibid.*, III, 494); but it cannot be taken as an example of Goldsmith's practice of repeating himself, for it is quoted almost word for word from Young's book (see *Conjectures on original composition*, ed. Edith J. Morley [Manchester, 1918], p. 9).

<sup>92</sup> *Critical review*, VII (June, 1759), 486-89 (*Works*, IV, 355-60).

<sup>93</sup> *Collected Letters*, p. 37.

tain, nor adventure to interest us in the calm anecdotes of such an existence. . . . Voltaire, however, may be justly exempted from the number of those obscure philosophers whose days have been passed between the fire-side and the easy chair.<sup>94</sup>

Then, over a year after the review, it appears in what sounds almost like a parody version of Formey's life in a paper on "a little great man" in the *Citizen of the world*:

It frequently happens that one of his little admirers sits down, big with the important subject, and is delivered of the history of his life and writings. This may properly be called the revolutions of a life between the fireside and the easy chair. In this we learn the year in which he was born, at what an early age he gave symptoms of uncommon genius and application, together with some of his smart sayings. . . . The next book introduces him to the university. . . . He next makes his appearance in the republic of letters, and publishes his folio. . . . The learned societies invite him to become a member: he disputes against some foreigner with a long Latin name, conquers in the controversy, is complimented by several authors of gravity and importance, is excessively fond of egg-sauce with his pig, becomes president of a literary club and dies in the meridian of his glory.<sup>95</sup>

In his second paragraph the reviewer ridicules Formey and his work in a manner suggestive of Goldsmith's treatment of German polite learning in the *Enquiry*.<sup>96</sup> More impressive is the reviewer's remark that "by arraigning his gravity or his learning, we incur some danger from the resentment of our brother journalists, and that class of men who are prudently for ever in the right," for Goldsmith a few months later closely parallels the latter part of the sentence while making a plea for literary originality in a

paper entitled "The characteristics of greatness" in the *Bee*: "Men are now content with being prudently in the right. . . ."<sup>97</sup>

The rest of the review is concerned with the details of Formey's book and shows no clear signs of Goldsmith's authorship.<sup>98</sup> The frequent criticisms of Formey's knowledge of physiology suggest someone like Goldsmith with a medical education, but Smollett and possibly other contributors to the *Critical review* had an acquaintance with physiology. The evidence of the first two paragraphs, however, would seem to justify the inclusion of the review in Goldsmith's works.

8. In the paper on Montesquieu's *Miscellaneous pieces* in the *Critical review* for June, 1759,<sup>99</sup> only the first two paragraphs are the reviewer's own, the rest being a long quotation from the book under consideration. Although these two paragraphs are written in a manner not unlike Goldsmith's, there seems to be nothing either in the first, which accounts for our delight in the trivia of celebrated authors, or in the second, which comments briefly on some of the pieces in the volume, that offers any parallels of either thought or expression with Goldsmith's writings. Consequently, unless it can be shown that the review furnishes internal evidence of the kind Prior implies he found in it, no place can be afforded it in the Goldsmith canon.

One other paper in the *Critical review* discussed by Prior requires brief consideration, for it is listed—though prefaced with a question mark—in the most recent

<sup>94</sup> *Works*, IV, 3.

<sup>95</sup> Letter LXXIV (*Works*, III, 281–82).

<sup>96</sup> See *Works*, III, 483.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 375.

<sup>98</sup> Gibbs (*ibid.*, IV, 358 n.) offers a parallel with Goldsmith's *Animated nature* (1774), but it is not very close, and in the compilation Goldsmith was usually working directly from sources.

<sup>99</sup> VII, 534–38 (*Works*, IV, 362–64).

bibliography of Goldsmith's writings.<sup>100</sup> This is the long article on Grainger's *A letter to Tobias Smollett, M.D., occasioned by his criticism on a late translation of Tibullus in the Critical review* for February, 1759.<sup>101</sup> The reason for believing the piece to be Goldsmith's is found in a manuscript note by Isaac Reed, which was at one time in Prior's possession. Reed, after mentioning a manuscript in Goldsmith's hand given to him "by Mr. Steevens, who received it from Hamilton, the printer," continues:

He had also another MS. by the Doctor, a defence of Dr. Smollett against Dr. Grainger's attack on him relative to the criticism on Tibullus in the Critical Review. The last I think Mr. Steevens gave to Mr. Beauclerk.<sup>102</sup>

Prior, who had not seen the manuscript review, raises the question of whether it and the printed article are the same and decides that the published version "from its tone and language is not likely to be wholly, if at all, from the pen of Goldsmith, or if so, it is unlike any thing else from the same source." Smollett, he thinks, "in return to a personal attack, would no doubt trust only to himself for vindication," although he "may have embodied in the reply such parts of this paper [i.e., the manuscript by Goldsmith] as related to the merely literary demerits of the work under consideration."<sup>103</sup>

Additional arguments may be advanced to reinforce Prior's skepticism about assigning the article in the *Critical review* in whole or in part to Goldsmith. First, the review offers no parallels of thought or expression with Goldsmith's works;<sup>104</sup> consequently, even if we should

accept Prior's suggestion that Smollett incorporated portions of Goldsmith's manuscript into the review, there would seem to be no way of deciding with any degree of precision what parts are his. Second, the review displays more detailed knowledge of a specialized kind—knowledge of classical languages, literature, and society; of the origin and usage of English words; of art; of contemporary literary quarrels—than Goldsmith shows in any of his writing, more, indeed, than he probably possessed. Goldsmith seems not to have been a learned person; when he wished to give an appearance of learning, he usually turned to some such source as the *Encyclopédie*. The learning in the review, however, is so varied and, for the most part, so distant from his own interests that it seems incredible that he could have written it without weeks of study and research. Finally, it is very improbable that a review so filled with personal abuse of Grainger is by Goldsmith. The two men had apparently become friends as fellow-contributors to the *Monthly review*,<sup>105</sup> and years later Goldsmith could refer to "my poor worthy friend Dr. Grainger."<sup>106</sup> More important, it was at Grainger's residence on February 21, 1759—just about the time at which this review was probably written—that Goldsmith met Percy. There is nothing we know of Goldsmith's character to lead us to believe that he would anonymously libel a supposed friend and at the same time accept his hospitality.

<sup>100</sup> By R. S. Crane in the *Cambridge bibliography of English literature*, II, 639.

<sup>101</sup> VII, 141–58; not reprinted by Gibbs.

<sup>102</sup> *Life*, I, 320.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 321–22.

<sup>104</sup> One sentence in the review, it may be noted, offers a parallel with Smollett's writing. The refer-

ence to "the obscure Arragonian author of a second part of Don Quixote, who in his abusive preface, complained that Cervantes had spoken disrespectfully of him and Lope de Vega" (p. 154) seems to be derived from Smollett's life of Cervantes in his translation of *Don Quixote* (London, 1755), I, xiv.

<sup>105</sup> See *Life*, I, 237–43.

<sup>106</sup> *A history of the earth and animated nature* (London, 1774), VI, 349.

## ATTRIBUTIONS SINCE PRIOR

After Prior's attributions of 1837, Goldsmith's nineteenth-century biographers and editors were not much concerned with his contributions to the *Critical review*; they did not dispute the ascriptions already made, and they reprinted no new pieces. In 1885, however, J. W. M. Gibbs referred in the fourth volume of his edition to two additional reviews which he thought might be by Goldsmith. His reason for each ascription is the same: in a review presumably by Goldsmith there is a reference to an earlier paper in the *Critical review* that suggests common authorship.

One of these attributions may be dismissed very briefly. In the article on Montesquieu's *Miscellaneous pieces* the reviewer says, "Of the essay on taste, we have spoken in our last Number"; and Gibbs suggests that "it may be an indication" that the paper on Gerard's *Essay on taste* in the *Critical review* for May<sup>107</sup> "is also by Goldsmith."<sup>108</sup> But even aside from the fact that the reviewer may be using "we" editorially rather than personally, there is no reason to accept the ascription. The review of Montesquieu, as has been indicated, affords no signs of Goldsmith's hand, while the review of Gerard not only offers no close parallels with Goldsmith's works but also contains passages which appear not to be his.<sup>109</sup>

The basis for the second ascription is found in the review, probably by Goldsmith, of Ward's *A system of oratory*:

<sup>107</sup> VII, 440-47.

<sup>108</sup> *Works*, IV, 364, n. 1.

<sup>109</sup> The reviewer, for example, states that "we can only speak with plausibility upon this topic [taste], never with certainty, till the relation between mind and body, the action of spirit upon matter, be fully explained"; but in the *Enquiry* Goldsmith had discussed taste in a manner which to him must have seemed more than merely plausible without being concerned with mind and body, spirit and matter.

In delivering our sentiments upon a former work, which had pretty much the same excellencies and the same defects with this before us, [Lawson's *Oratory*]<sup>110</sup> we hinted our opinion, that eloquence is more improved by the perusal of the great masters . . . than by an attendance on the lectures of such who pretend to teach the art by rule. . . . We shall here then take the liberty of pursuing the thought. . . .

Here the reviewer may seem to be referring to an earlier piece of his own, and consequently Gibbs's suggestion that "the Lawson article is by the same hand"<sup>111</sup> deserves more serious consideration.

The fact that the review of Lawson's *Lectures concerning oratory* appeared in the *Critical review* for November, 1758,<sup>112</sup> raises an initial doubt concerning Goldsmith's authorship; for he contributed four papers to the *Monthly review* of the following month and did not, so far as is known, begin his association with the *Critical review* until January, 1759. An examination of the review itself does little to allay this doubt. It is true that at the beginning of the paper the reviewer takes an attitude toward oratory that Goldsmith takes toward all literature—that genius is best cultivated, not by rules, but by the study of earlier practitioners of the art. Beyond this general agreement, however, the review contains no striking parallels with Goldsmith's writings,<sup>113</sup> and it has one sentence which points away from his authorship. The reviewer says: "The world knows perfectly well what is meant by *wit* and

<sup>110</sup> The bracketed phrase is in the original text.

<sup>111</sup> *Works*, IV, 348, n. 1.

<sup>112</sup> VI, 386-402.

<sup>113</sup> The knowledge of the Spanish language shown on p. 390 of the review may suggest Smollett's hand, and the reference on p. 389 to Sternhold and Hopkins may point to the person who, the following February, wrote the review of Grainger's *Letter to Tobias Smollett* (see *Critical review*, VII, 153).

*taste*; yet all who have attempted to define these qualities, fail in their endeavours." In the *Enquiry*, probably completed by the time this review was written, Goldsmith discusses both these qualities; concerning wit he shows that the world, far from knowing what it is, "generally mistakes humour for wit, which is a very different excellence,"<sup>114</sup> and he and the reviewer discuss taste in quite different terms.<sup>115</sup>

Even, then, if Goldsmith's authorship of the review of Ward is accepted, there is slight reason to think that he wrote the earlier paper on Lawson as well. It seems probable that in preparing the article on Ward he remembered a sympathetic position expressed shortly before his connection with the *Critical review* began; and, instead of giving careful consideration to Ward's book, he referred to the earlier review as an excuse for introducing a general discussion of oratory that could be borrowed from the *Encyclopédie*.

Since the time of Gibba's edition, only four additions have been made to the canon of Goldsmith's writings for the *Critical review*. The first of these was made in passing by the late R. W. Seitz<sup>116</sup> while discussing the question of Goldsmith's connection with the *Christian magazine*. Seitz notes that in the receipt dated October 11, 1763, from the publisher Newbery in which Goldsmith acknowledges eleven guineas for "Brookes' History"—presumably for writing the

Preface and Introductions for R. Brookes's *A new and accurate system of natural history*—he also acknowledges three guineas for "Critical and Monthly." Now at this time there appeared in the *Monthly review* for October a criticism of Brookes's *Natural history* which the publisher Griffiths in his marked copy assigns to Goldsmith. "The reviews of the same work in the *Critical Review*, in the August and October issues respectively,"<sup>117</sup> Seitz continues, "are suspiciously similar in tone to that in the *Monthly*." And he concludes that "apparently Newbery employed Goldsmith not only to prepare Brookes's book for the public, but also to prepare the public for Brookes's book."

Seitz does not extend his comparison between the reviews in the two periodicals beyond similarity of tone. There are, however, a number of quite specific parallels between them: both journals raise the question of whether Brookes is to be considered as a compiler or a contributor to science and decide that he is merely a judicious compiler; in both, the system of Linnaeus is criticized as being too complicated; both refer scornfully to systems of natural history which permit the elephant and the mole to be classed together; in both, French and English ways of writing natural history are contrasted; both apologize for the dryness of Brookes's manner; the one quotation from Brookes's work in the *Monthly review* is taken from an introduction written by Goldsmith, while the one in the second article in the *Critical review* is an overlapping quotation from the same introduction, and the one in the first paper in the *Critical review* is from another of Goldsmith's introductions.

There are two other bits of evidence that tend to confirm Goldsmith's authorship of the articles in the *Critical*

<sup>114</sup> *Works*, III, 515.

<sup>115</sup> Goldsmith defines taste in writing as "the exhibition of the greatest quantity of beauty and of use that may be admitted into any description without counteracting each other" (*ibid.*, p. 535), while the reviewer says that taste is "a delicate, acute perception, in the powers of fancy, as well as in faculties of the understanding."

<sup>116</sup> "Goldsmith's *Lives of the fathers*," *MP*, XXVI (1929), 295–305, particularly 304.

<sup>117</sup> XVI (1763), 144–49, 310–12.

review. Near the beginning of the first paper the reviewer mentions the first volume of Brookes's *Natural history* as "all that has been hitherto published"; at the end he says: "We have looked over the succeeding volumes, of which we may give some future account," and he mentions "the second, which in our opinion is every way superior to the former." It seems very improbable that any reviewer except one who, like Goldsmith, was closely associated with Newbery would have examined the remaining volumes before publication.

The other evidence is possibly more amusing than convincing. Goldsmith, it would seem, was employed by Newbery to make entertaining additions to Brookes's *Natural history*, a work which the reviewers in both the *Critical review* and the *Monthly review* are forced to admit is tolerably dull. The writer in the *Critical review*, in introducing the quotations from Goldsmith's introductions, calls attention, however, to the fact that some parts rise above the others.

Yet we would not be understood by all this to insinuate that the present compilation . . . affords no amusement. . . . There are several parts of the performance that will be found highly pleasing, even to the most indolent reader. Giving an account of the general classes and divisions of quadrupedes, he goes on thus. . . .

Then follows the first quotation from Goldsmith. And the second is introduced by saying that the author "often quits the dry, scientific tone, to address the imagination." Who, it may be asked, would have known better than Goldsmith that the only parts of the *Natural history* that could be called "highly pleasing," the only parts "to address the imagination," were those written by Goldsmith himself?

The three remaining attributions to Goldsmith have all been made by R. S. Crane. For one of these—the criticism of R. Kedington's *Critical dissertations upon the Iliad of Homer* in the *Critical review* for January, 1760—he has presented a demonstration which brings together so many lines of evidence that there can be no real doubt concerning Goldsmith's authorship.<sup>118</sup> The other two, however, he has merely listed, prefacing them with question marks to indicate that they are doubtful pieces, in his bibliography of Goldsmith in the *Cambridge bibliography of English literature*,<sup>119</sup> and it is consequently necessary to determine the basis of the ascriptions.

The first of these reviews, that of *Miscellaneous tracts relating to natural history, husbandry, and physick* in the *Critical review* for March, 1759,<sup>120</sup> is, with the exception of the first and last paragraphs, devoted to quotation and summary of the work under consideration; and the reviewer consequently leaves himself little opportunity to express his own ideas. In the first paragraph, however, there is one passage strongly suggestive of Goldsmith:

Perhaps never could more advantage be reaped from a journey into Asia than now; our knowledge of nature has arrived to such a degree of perfection, as only wants to be a little farther extended, to render it as complete as we are capable of making it: how much might be known among the Eastern kingdoms, and how little do we know of them already? how ignorant are we even of the manners and customs of the Turks our neighbours; and what wonders of nature and art are there which till lately we never so much as heard of? . . . The truth is, travellers have hitherto almost constantly copied from each other.

<sup>118</sup> "A neglected mid-eighteenth-century plea for originality and its author," *Philological quarterly*, XIII (1934), 21-29.

<sup>119</sup> II, 639.

<sup>120</sup> VII, 225-41 [=33].

.... But, though the first traveller had used all necessary caution, .... yet in the revolution of a single century countries will change their appearance, and, as we have seen in Italy, milder seasons, other animals, and vegetables unknown to antiquity, may succeed.

The "advantage to be reaped from a journey into Asia" is certainly a subject that greatly interested Goldsmith; he seems for many years to have projected such a visit himself,<sup>121</sup> and on two occasions later than this review he urged such an undertaking—first in the criticism of Van Egmont and Heyman's *Travels* and again in the *Citizen of the world*, Letter CVIII, entitled "The utility and entertainment that might result from a journey into the East."<sup>122</sup> These later papers, however, are largely concerned with the kind of philosophic traveler who could best undertake such a journey and with examples of practical knowledge that could be obtained by it, and they offer almost nothing in the way of exact parallels with the present review. The remark near the end of the passage quoted above that "in the revolution of a single century countries will change their appearance" is similar to the statement in the review of Van Egmont and Heyman that "a single age introduces new customs and manners, as well as inhabitants"; and the illustration of changes in Italy is in part paralleled in Goldsmith's essay, "The effect which climates have upon men, and other animals," published in 1760: "The climate of Italy has, for several ages, been different from what it was in the times of the ancient Romans. Those sharp winters of which the ancients complained, are felt there no longer. ...."<sup>123</sup> In addition, the sentences in the last paragraph of the re-

view comparing books to people bear a slight resemblance to a passage in the *Citizen of the world*.<sup>124</sup> What evidence there is, then, is on the side of Goldsmith's authorship; but, since it is hardly full enough to put the question beyond reasonable doubt, the piece may best remain where Mr. Crane seems to have placed it, among the uncertain ascriptions.

The one attribution remaining to be considered—the review of Franklin's translation of *The tragedies of Sophocles* in the *Critical review* for June, 1759<sup>125</sup>—is perhaps more doubtful. The only significant parallels with Goldsmith's writings occur in the first paragraph. The reviewer begins with the following comments on the Greek language and people:

To those who know the great difference between the idioms of the Greek and English languages, and what is still more to be considered, the vast dissimilitude of manners, customs, and religious rites, between the simplicity of antient times, and the polished improvements of the present age, the difficulty of this undertaking will appear in its full force: nay, if these circumstances be remembered, we shall be surprized to see the personages of the Iliad make any tolerable figure in a modern theatre, while they retain the texture and form of their own antient dress and dialogue.

And a little later in the paragraph he comments on the resemblance between the "unpolished character" of the Greek language and "the roughness of the times and people from which it was culled." Now on at least three occasions—twice earlier and once later than this review—Goldsmith comments on the ignorance or barbarity of the ancient Greeks and suggests a relationship between this lack of cultivation and their poetry. "We have no reason to doubt," he writes in a re-

<sup>121</sup> See Prior, *Life*, I, 317, 383–86.

<sup>122</sup> See *Works*, IV, 360–62, and III, 387–91.

<sup>123</sup> *New essays*, p. 5.

<sup>124</sup> Letter LXXV (*Works*, III, 283).

<sup>125</sup> VII, 512–20.

view of 1757, "but Homer, who lived in an age of ignorance, and consequently of credulity, believed, or at least was thought to believe, what he relates."<sup>126</sup> He returns to much the same point in the *Enquiry*: "Homer describes his gods as his countrymen believed them. Virgil, in a more enlightened age, describes his with a greater degree of respect; and Milton still rises infinitely above either."<sup>127</sup> Finally, early in 1760, in the review of Kedington's *Critical dissertations upon the Iliad*, Goldsmith expresses himself more fully:

In the times when Homer wrote, barbarity, ignorance, lust, and cruelty, were still in fashion; and, we may justly say, that heroism was never worse known than in those ages which were called heroic. These barbarous manners tincture his whole poem, and certainly lessen our delight.<sup>128</sup>

The other passage in the review deserving attention comes at the end of the first paragraph:

An English dramatic author, instead of consulting the judgment, must appeal to the imagination, the fancy, and the passions of his hearers. Instead of moralizing in dull apothegms, he must rouze, elevate, surprize, and tickle, with rage, declamation, wit, and humour. A French parterre, naturally volatile, must be lulled and fixed with dry maxims couched in smooth couplets; an English pit, naturally saturnine, must be stimulated with the business and agitation of the scene; with revolutions, recognitions, repartee, and alteration.

A difference between French and English theatrical audiences, with a corresponding difference in the plays of the two nations—recognized in English dramatic criticism since at least the time of Dryden—is suggested by Goldsmith in the *Enquiry*:

<sup>126</sup> *Works*, IV, 290.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 530.

<sup>128</sup> *Critical review*, IX, 13.

If . . . the English be a people who look upon death as an incident no way terrible, but sometimes fly to it for refuge from the calamities of life, why should a Frenchman be disgusted at our bloody stage? there is nothing hideous in the representation to one of us, whatever there might be to him.<sup>129</sup>

It should be noted, however, that the reviewer suggests that plays please a nation by being in contrast to the national character rather than by agreeing with it. Goldsmith's concern in the *Enquiry*, moreover, is not, like that of the reviewer, to indicate how the taste of a nation influences its plays but to show that plays, which imitate national manners, can be judged only by people to whom these manners are known—that is, by a national standard of taste.<sup>130</sup> We must conclude, then, that the evidence for the review of Franklin's translation of Sophocles, though suggestive of Goldsmith's authorship, is not sufficiently conclusive to admit the piece without qualification into the Goldsmith canon.

#### OTHER POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS

Since about half the ascriptions to Goldsmith of articles in the *Critical review* have been made entirely on the basis of internal evidence, the question arises as to whether there are any papers not previously noticed that offer signs of his hand. The answer is, I think, that, although no new pieces can be ascribed to him with a sufficiently high degree of probability to admit them to a place among his works, there are four reviews which suggest in varying degrees the hypothesis of his authorship. These new papers are presented here, then, not as additions to the canon but as a basis for future research.

#### 1. Attention is immediately attracted

<sup>129</sup> *Works*, III, 535.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 532-33.

to the one-page notice of *The beldames: a poem* in the *Critical review* for February, 1759,<sup>131</sup> by the reviewer's remark after summarizing the poem in the first sentence: "We wanted no ghost, the reader will be apt to cry out, to inform us of this." This paraphrase of Horatio is, as readers of *She stoops to conquer* will remember, very close to Marlow's exclamation in the second scene of the play: "We wanted no ghost to tell us that."<sup>132</sup> Better evidence of Goldsmith's authorship appears in the reviewer's consideration of contemporary poetry:

So little improvement do we meet with in modern poetry, that it is now almost fallen into disrepute. Half a century ago, poetical productions were fashionable: at present, he that writes in verse has scarce a chance to be read; and at best is soon forgotten. The reason of this change of taste in the public may be, that in modern poetry we merely study to amuse without conveying information; and have a chain of trite thoughts prettily ornamented running through many well-known performances: thus we admire the poet, without feeling his beauties.

A very similar attitude toward the poetry of his own day is consistently taken by Goldsmith. Concerning the decline of poetry in popular favor and the reasons for this change in taste he thus speaks in the *Bee*:

At present, were a man to attempt to improve his fortune or increase his friendship by poetry, he would soon feel the anxiety of disappointment. The press lies open, and is a benefactor to every sort of literature but that alone.

I am at a loss whether to ascribe this falling off of the public to a vicious taste in the poet, or in them. . . . The poet, either dryly didactic, gives us rules which might appear abstruse even in a system of ethics, or, triflingly volatile, writes upon the most unworthy

subjects; content, if he can give music instead of sense. . . .<sup>133</sup>

The reviewer's criticism of modern poetry—that it is "prettily ornamented" but conveys no information—is elaborated by the Chinese philosopher in the *Citizen of the world*:

But it is chiefly in gentle poetry where I seldom look farther than the title. The truth is, I take up books to be told something new; but here, as it is now managed, the reader is told nothing. He opens the book, and there finds very good words, truly, and much exactness of rhyme, but no information. A parcel of gaudy images pass on before his imagination like the figures in a dream; but curiosity, induction, reason, and the whole train of affections, are fast asleep.<sup>134</sup>

These similarities seem close enough to make an ascription of the piece to Goldsmith somewhat probable; but, until more is known about the attitudes toward contemporary poetry of other writers for the *Critical review*, no final determination of authorship can be made.

2. The one-page notice in the *Critical review* for March, 1759, of *The life and real adventures of Hamilton Murray, written by himself*<sup>135</sup> is similarly related to Goldsmith's writings. Speaking of contemporary novels the reviewer says:

Works of this nature might be wrote so as to inspire sentiments of diligence, industry and frugality. Instead of that, the hero of a modern romance is always a fellow of spirit, who makes debauchery a symptom of his easy good-nature; who ridicules the dull mechanic who remains at home and minds his business. The young apprentice takes fire as he reads; he is taught to regard his station with contempt, sighs that he is not the charming fellow, wishes to become rather an amusing than a useful member of society; at length finds resolution

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 451, and cf. p. 359.

<sup>132</sup> Letter XCVII (*Works*, III, 358); cf. Mr. Burchell's remarks in *The vicar of Wakefield*, chap. viii (*Works*, I, 98).

<sup>133</sup> VII, 282-83.

<sup>131</sup> VII, 173.

<sup>132</sup> *Works*, II, 229.

to sally out at midnight in quest of adventure, and ceases not till he has experienced every misery. Such are the consequences of reading romance as it is now conducted. . . .

In his essay "On education" in the *Bee*, Goldsmith speaks in a like manner of what romances should be and what they are not:

As boys should be educated with temperance, so the first, greatest lesson that should be taught them is, to admire frugality. It is by the exercise of this virtue alone, they can ever expect to be useful members of society. . . .

Instead, therefore, of romances, which praise young men of spirit, who go through a variety of adventures, and, at last, conclude a life of dissipation, folly, and extravagance, in riches and matrimony, there should be some men of wit employed to compose books that might equally interest the passions of our youth; where such a one might be praised for having resisted allurements when young, and how he, at last, became Lord Mayor. . . .<sup>136</sup>

In commenting on the work under consideration, the reviewer says: "It contains a strain of pertness, that among the ignorant passes for humour"; and this is paralleled by Goldsmith's remarks on pertness in the *Citizen of the world*:

But *Bawdry* is often helped on by another figure, called *Pertness*. . . . As in common conversation, the best way to make the audience laugh is by first laughing yourself; so, in writing, the properest manner is to show an attempt at humour, which will pass upon most for humour in reality.<sup>137</sup>

It seems, then, that the similarities between the reviewer and Goldsmith make the hypothesis of his authorship of the piece a not improbable one, though the attitude taken toward romances is prob-

ably not sufficiently distinctive to make the ascription certain.

3. In the article on Floyer Sydenham's *A synopsis, or general view of the works of Plato* in the *Critical review* for December, 1759,<sup>138</sup> the reviewer devotes much of his space to a brief history of philosophy from the time of Socrates; and when he comes to the period of the Renaissance, one passage is of interest:

And here it might be observed, what naturally must happen at the revival of letters. Nobody thought of composing new works; such a conduct would not have been natural, while the world was in possession of so many works already, to which it was quite a stranger: thus the labours of those times were turned to the grammarian's art, to criticism, to erudition, and to an investigation of antiquities. When mankind were furnished with a power of understanding the ancients by this means, the next thing was to imitate them; and systems were made and disputed upon.

With this may be compared a passage which had appeared in the *Bee* almost two months earlier:

Thus, at the renewal of letters in Europe, the taste was not to compose new books, but to comment on the old ones. It was not to be expected that new books should be written, when there were so many of the ancients either not known or not understood. It was not reasonable to attempt new conquests, while they had such an extensive region lying waste for want of cultivation. At that period, criticism and erudition were the reigning studies of the times; and he who had only an inventive genius, might have languished in hopeless obscurity. When the writers of antiquity were sufficiently explained and known, the learned set about imitating them: from hence proceeded the number of Latin orators, poets, and historians. . . .<sup>139</sup>

The similarities between these passages, which seem too great to be accounted for by chance, suggest that in the review

<sup>136</sup> *Works*, II, 405; cf. *Citizen of the world*, Letter LXXXIII (*Works*, III, 311-12) and Goldsmith's letter of January, 1759, to his brother (*Collected letters*, p. 60).

<sup>137</sup> Letter LIII (*Works*, III, 202).

<sup>138</sup> VIII, 421-27.

<sup>139</sup> *Works*, II, 397.

Goldsmith was following his frequent practice of borrowing from himself. But other explanations are quite possible, though their probability would be difficult to determine: the reviewer may have been borrowing from the *Bee*, or the two writers may have been dependent on a common source. It should be stated, too, that the knowledge of the history of philosophy shown in the review is not paralleled in any of Goldsmith's original works. Unless, then, further evidence of Goldsmith's authorship can be shown, the piece must remain doubtful.

4. In the *Critical review* for July, 1760, finally, there appears a one-page paper on Foote's *The minor: a comedy*<sup>140</sup> that offers close parallels with Goldsmith's works. The reviewer's remark in the first paragraph that "Mr. Foote's present attempt serves to shew, that comic humour is by no means worn out, but that new absurdities may be every day started even in the politest age" resembles a statement made by Goldsmith with reference to comedy in the *Enquiry*: "Every age produces new follies and new vices, and one absurdity is often displaced in order to make room for another."<sup>141</sup> The reviewer then continues in the second paragraph:

Comedy, it must be owned, has ever excelled in those periods when a people just began to refine; good breeding, and politeness, seem to be little more than a levelling of oddities, a correction of the luxuriances of our nature. Thus, in a very polite age, every character seems almost the same; and those absurdities, which are the poet's game, are scarce found to exist, or at least, not in sufficient number to make the satire generally pleasing.

A very similar discussion of absurdity as "the poet's game" and of its relation to good breeding appears in the *Enquiry*:

. . . . they [the critics] have proscribed the comic or satirical muse from every walk but high life, which, though abounding in fools as well as the humblest station, is by no means so fruitful in absurdity. Among well-bred fools we may despise much, but have little to laugh at; nature seems to present us with a universal blank of silk, ribbons, smiles, and whispers. Absurdity is the poet's game, and good-breeding is the nice concealment of absurdities.<sup>142</sup>

In the last paragraph the reviewer, commenting on Foote's borrowing from Molière, remarks that on the English stage "wit is expected as well as humour: and when we consider how seldom wit and humour are united in the same person, we should not be surprised the poet is sometimes obliged to have recourse to foreign assistance." Goldsmith, in a continuation of the passage just quoted from the *Enquiry*, similarly distinguishes wit and humor:

The truth is, the critic generally mistakes humour for wit, which is a very different excellence. Wit raises human nature above its level; humour acts a contrary part, and equally depresses it. To expect exalted humour is a contradiction in terms. . . .

These various signs point clearly in the direction of Goldsmith's authorship, though they are perhaps not extensive enough for a definite conclusion. Doubt may be raised by the fact that the piece appeared in the *Critical review* four months after Goldsmith's last known contribution, though there is no reason to think that he may not have occasionally written a paper after his regular connection had ceased.<sup>143</sup>

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 515.

<sup>141</sup> Attention may be called briefly to one further review—that of *A letter from M. Rousseau, of Geneva to M. D'Alembert, of Paris, concerning the effects of theatrical entertainments on the manners of mankind* in the *Critical review* for January, 1759 (VII, 48-59). The character given to Rousseau in the first paragraph is not unlike that given in the *Enquiry* (cf. *Works*, III,

## THE CANON

Below are listed as they appear, if the conclusions of this study are accepted, all the reviews in the *Critical review* which have been ascribed to Goldsmith. In the first list question marks are placed before the six pieces whose place in the canon depends wholly upon the testimony of *Essays and criticisms* without the support of internal evidence.

## I. REVIEWS CONTRIBUTED BY GOLDSMITH

- (?)Marriott's *Female conduct* (January, 1759) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- Barrett's translation of Ovid's *Epistles* (January) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- Langhorne's *The death of Adonis* (March) [Prior]
- Ward's *A system of oratory* (April) [Prior]
- Murphy's *The orphan of China* (May) [Prior]
- Formey's *Philosophical miscellanies* (June) [Prior]
- Van Egmont and Heyman's *Travels through part of Europe* (June) [Prior]
- (?)Marriott's *The twentieth epistle of Horace to his book, modernized* (July) [*Essays and and criticisms*]
- The dramatic works of Mr. Philip Massinger* (July) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- (?)Guicciardini's *The history of Italy* (August) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- (?)*The works of Mr. William Hawkins* (August) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- (?)*Jemima and Louisa* (August) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- Prose portion of *The genuine remains in verse and prose of Mr. Samuel Butler* (September) [*Essays and criticisms*]

494. More important, the distinctive defense of luxury in the review closely resembles that later made by Goldsmith in the *Citizen of the world*, Letter XI, in *The traveller*, and in *The deserted village*; but this parallel loses much of its force by the fact that in his treatment of luxury the reviewer is making a very close but unacknowledged borrowing from Hume's essays "Of refinement in the arts" and "Of the delicacy of taste and passion."

- Kedington's *Critical dissertations upon the Iliad of Homer* (January, 1760) [Crane]
- (?)*A review of the works of the Rev. W. Hawkins* (March) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- Dunkin's *An epistle to the Earl of Chesterfield* (March) [*Essays and criticisms*]
- Brookes's *A new and accurate system of natural history* (August, October, 1763) [Seitz]

## II. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDING FURTHER EVIDENCE

- The beldames: a poem* (February, 1759)
- Miscellaneous tracts relating to natural history, husbandry, and physick* (March) [Crane]
- Goguet's *De l'origine des loix, des arts, et des sciences* (March) [Prior]
- The life and real adventures of Hamilton Murray* (March)
- Francklin's *The tragedies of Sophocles* (June) [Crane]
- Sydenham's *A synopsis, or general view of the works of Plato* (December)
- Foote's *The minor: a comedy* (July, 1760)

## III. REVIEWS TO BE DROPPED FROM THE CANON

- Massey's translation of Ovid's *Fasti* (November, 1757) [*Westminster magazine*, April, 1774; Prior]
- Lawson's *Lectures concerning oratory* (November, 1758) [Gibbs]
- Church's edition of *The faerie queene* (February, 1759) [Prior]
- Grainger's *A letter to Tobias Smollett* (February) [See Prior's *Life*]
- Gerard's *Essay on taste* (May) [Gibbs]
- Young's *Conjectures on original composition* (June) [Prior]
- Montesquieu's *Miscellaneous pieces* (June) [Prior]
- Verse portion of *Genuine remains in verse and prose of Mr. Samuel Butler* (July) [*Essays and criticisms*]

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*The conflict of homonyms in English.* By EDNA REES WILLIAMS. ("Yale studies in English," Vol. C.) New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1944. Pp. xii+127.

Applying to English a formula which Jules Gilliéron derived from French—that words change more rapidly if ambiguous—this monograph surveys facts and arguments better known on the Continent than in England and examines a set of "homonyms," like *queen* : *quean*, with a thoroughness that should promote further research. Falling short of perfection, the work is welcome, nevertheless, as the first book-length approach to a problem whose importance is no less great than our eagerness to have it solved.

In the introduction, chapter i defines the study in an orthodox way as a technique of dialectology and defends it from heresies of old, save only those of Millardet and Vossler. Chapter ii leads the beginner to Iordan on Romance linguistics and to Bach's *Deutsche Mundartforschung*, while chapter iii criticizes without undue sharpness the few slender "Works on homonyms in English." Few titles are missing from this well-compressed history of the scholarship, but I would add, first of all, A. Kieft, *Homonymie en haar invloed op de taalontwikkeling* (Groningen, 1938); and then A. Meillet, "Sur les effets de l'homonymie dans les anciennes langues indo-européennes," *Cinquantenaire de l'Ecole pratique des hautes études* (1921), pp. 169-80; and J. Gonda, "Zur homonymie im Altindischen," *Acta orientalia*, XIV (1936), 161-202. Especially weak is the paragraph (p. 31) on studies of homonymy in languages other than French and German.

To justify her own methods and plan, Professor Williams next weighs the advantages of linguistic atlas and historical dictionary as sources of proof. More than the obvious necessity makes her favor the latter. The *Atlas linguistique de la France* (=ALF) enabled Gilliéron and his followers to speak with "mathematical exactness," she admits, "but one could wish now and then for more of the historical view" (p. 39). French philologists will find, however, that the footnote here, naming only Jud and Jaberg as exceptions, understates their case. Neglected is a major work in point, Walther von Wartburg's *Französisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, which seeks everywhere, particularly in instances of homophony, to support Gilliéron's flat maps with data from the past. Almost twenty years ago Spitzer expressed a preference for the dictionary over the atlas, if he could not have both;<sup>1</sup> and for the past decade, at least, the linguistic geographer of France has readily employed such historical tools as Mario Roques's *Recueil général des lexiques français du moyen âge* (Paris, 1936). Indeed, by taking the *New English dictionary on historical principles* (=NED) as the basis of research, the author merely concurs in the latest trend of her school.

Since the doctrine, however, is dominated still by a principle of geography, the NED loses out in practice to Joseph Wright's *English dialect dictionary* (=EDD), whose defects, as a substitute for the ALF, are acknowledged in the introduction but never compensated for thereafter. Assuming from the start that the investigation of "homonyms" must be wholly dialectal, Miss Williams aims "to show the abundant sources of material for a study of the English vocabulary along lines made clear by the recent work in linguistic geography," and she claims that "all available special studies of dialects have been constantly referred to" (p. 42). Now it is the English philologist who will find his cause advanced but halfway. No reference is made, for example, to the long review article by F. Schubel, "Zur neueren englischen Dialektforschung," *Englische Studien*, LXXIII (1939), 344-80; a dozen works there listed might have been used with profit.

<sup>1</sup> L. Spitzer, "Atlas linguistique ou grammaires-dictionnaires-textes," *Revue internationale des études basques*, XIX (1928), 1-7.

Although Middle English forms are quoted time and again, not one special work on ME dialects is mentioned: the writer ignores both the dictionary collectanea at the University of Michigan and the discussion founded thereon by Moore, Meech, and Whitehall (1937); disregarded, too, are Oakden's survey (1930) and the important treatise by Rolf Kaiser, *Zur Geographie des mittelenglischen Wortschatzes* (Leipzig, 1937), as well as kindred works by Hammerschlag (1937), Linke (1935), and Peitz (1933). Several monographs on English spelling, moreover—in particular those which relate to "Conflicts involving ME. ē and ME. ē" (pp. 71 ff.)—might have been consulted, if only for the data they supply: e.g., E. Grosse, *Die neuenglische "ea"-Schreibung* (Leipzig, 1937), and H. Weiss, *Die "ie(ee)"-Schreibung im Englischen* (Bottrop i.W., 1937); cf. also H. M. Flasdieck, "Zum Lautwert von ME. ē im 18. Jahrhundert," *Anglia*, LX (1936), 377–83. These omissions, dating the bibliography years behind its time, disturb us less, however, than the absence of certain leading ideas—*gesunkenes Sprachgut*, speech-islands, *Polysémie*. Miss Williams leaves out the usual remarks contrasting the spread of Parisian French with the persistence in Germany of dialect areas determined by an ancient political order. We miss, therefore, an inquiry into the long-term movements of English dialect: in English were the counties all-important, as Wright's dictionary conveniently makes them appear on a map? Standard English, so often cited, is nowhere defined, save by implication as the "so-called 'polite' language" (p. 84) or the speech of the nonfarming people of London (p. 51). Never reckoned with, then, is the expansion of East Midland in a dynamic give-and-take with the dialects of the north and west. Uncalled on, in consequence, is the notion of linguistic residues along the periphery, which might help to explain the distant concurrence of words in Cornwall, Norfolk, and Scotland.

In the studies, the word-pairs, chosen to illustrate the process of obsolescence as an effect of homophony, are sometimes obvious if the theory be at all enlightening; and our conviction is not always increased by the exactness

with which phonetic changes are dated and localized—e.g., the brief, nondialectal discussion of *weigh* (pp. 96–97) seems no less believable than the elaborate treatment of *gate* (pp. 57–69). The isolated pairs are more successfully worked out than the groups of words, e.g., containing ME *ai*. In general, some pairs are too casually noticed, e.g., *tray*, 'to vex, to betray,' where nothing is said of *train*, 'deceit'; some problems are left unsettled, e.g., on *kidney* as a compound of *near*, developing by reason of an old homophony; and at least one word should have been kept out entirely, i.e., OE *lēan*, 'to blame,' since it would never coincide with *lēanan* or *lēanian*. The reconstructed forms of Primitive Germanic betray a lack of training in comparative philology: some do not conform to the currently accepted standard, e.g., \**auso-n* (p. 53), \**brāð-an* and \**brāðjan* (p. 80) (cf. also IE \**gʷʰenōn* [p. 83]); others are out-and-out wrong, e.g., \**auso-n* (p. 48), \**laihuniz*, -*oz*- (p. 72), \**hailo-z* (p. 79) (cf. the derivation of OE *helian* from \**haljan* [p. 78], and "OE ē (from WGmc. *ai*)" [p. 80]). I continue, in smaller type, with notes of detail, some of them drawn from the introduction:

*Page 10:* OE *eaxl* should be mentioned, since the derivation of *axe* "from ON. *óxull* in *óxul-tre* [sic]" is phonologically awkward. *Page 12, note 16:* Instead of "shotgun" read "pistol," and see the DAE, s.v. "Forty-four." *Page 13:* Include *paling* in the discussion of *pale* and *pallet*. *Page 19:* "OF. *fisician* < Lat. *physic-a*?"? *Page 33:* OE *dr*, of various meanings, is treated at length by Kieft, *Homonymie*, pp. 85–89. *Page 35:* That "the theory of conflict has gained acceptance . . . in histories of languages" is more strongly put than the examples warrant. *Page 57:* On *gait* see Craigie, *Some anomalies of spelling* ("S.P.E. Tracts," No. 59). *Page 69:* In the text nothing is said about the meaning 'pasturage' in the legend to Map 2. *Page 71:* ME ē is not involved in any of the conflicts dealt with in the section headed "Conflicts involving ME. ē and ME. ē." *Page 72:* The quotation in note 8 from the *NED* should have been checked; Brandl-Zippel<sup>2</sup> gives the variant reading as 'leane (or leave).' *Page 73:* For the parallel history of Du. *leuen* see van Ginneken, *Onze taaltuin*, II (1933), 125, and Kieft, page 17. *Page 74:* *Hlēne* and *lēne* probably collocated in OE times. *Page 76:* The following is not

atypical of the book's style: ". . . the historical, the chronological, aspects of their history. . . ." *Page 81:* What about *brede*, 'board'? (noted by Hammerschlag, *Dialekteneinflüsse*, pp. 96-97). *Page 83:* I have not seen H. Pedersen's article on *queen* : *quean* and *wife*, in the Ekwall miscellany (1942). *Page 91:* The "Note on Map 3" turns up unexpectedly on page 85. *Page 101:* On *gain* see Kaiser, pages 109, 206. *Page 115:* In the discussion of *churn*, as of *ear* : *near*, the development of vowels before *r* is taken lightly, without due consideration, e.g., of articles by Gabrielson (*Studi neophilologici*, III [1930], 1-10) and Flasdieck (*Anglia*, LVI [1932], 113-264, 321-420). *Page 114:* The area marked out in Map 7 does not look like "southeast Worcestershire."

Now these reflections, serious or trivial, stay within range of the science to which the work properly belongs; but, since homonymy is a topic common to other fields of learning, any treatment of the subject will also be viewed from afar. Today the linguist who adopts the Gilliéronian technique must reject, or be prepared to defend, its logic and psychology.

Professor Williams, it is true, confesses "no attempt to establish a logical order in discussing the various examples" (p. 42), such a venture being thought perhaps more hazardous than reliance on the *EDD*. But in limiting her doctrine to "words established within the same sphere of thought," she pursues traditional logic, as did Gilliéron, through at least one stage. Kieft warned that this standard is too vaguely set, and lapses from it are not surprising; compare, for example, the section on ME *bred*, 'bread, roast meat, trick, breadth,' where it seems proved, in defiance of the principle avowed, that simple homonyms, equivocal *a casu*, do not survive the accident unimpaired. And in the probing of analogy there is no advance to a discrimination of kinds: both *ear*, 'ear,' and *ear*, 'kidney,' for instance, are intrinsically parts of the body, whereas behind *churm*, 'a sound, a churn,' stands an extrinsic ratio. Inattentiveness to the *secundum quid* of proportions may, indeed, be a source of that "semantic confusion" which the author always blames upon the native speaker.

Since the early writings of Meringer and Freud, the modern psychologist, joined by

such literary critics as Kenneth Burke, has directed an increasingly subtle analysis to the emotional quality of puns and ambiguities. To this group, and to those philologists who charged that Gilliéron neglected the creative and artistic, the dogmas of *pathologie et thérapeutique* must sound like the mannerisms of a dead master. Aware of "unpleasant connotation," Miss Williams recognizes, but does not evaluate, a factor of "derogatory significance" in the history of *queen* : *quean*; and the psychiatrist will wonder why a like element was not sensed in the study of *ear*, 'ear, kidney.' But what of pleasantries, too? A house-bound poet might well remark that *churm*, 'clatter,' is a happy metaphor for the noisy *churn*, objecting that, if homophones may die of embarrassment, they may also be born of inspiration. And what, after all, is the causal role of pleasure-pain in semantic change? How did sly good humor, for example, "cause" the selection of *vicaire* as a substitute for *gat*, 'gallus'? For an answer to these questions, the linguist must, however vainly, seek to discover in some psychology the locus of the feelings and their relation to the understanding.

To solve all unfinished problems, however, Miss Williams hopes for an accumulation of glossaries and a multiplication of dialectal maps. I have myself been easily awed to conclusions by large amassments of fact, but for the interpretation of analogies it seems to me that logic surpasses statistics; and I marvel at the economy of any linguistic geographer who would not trade five or more *cartes* from the *ALF* for one good map of the human mind.

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*Surveys of recent scholarship in the period of Renaissance.* Compiled for the Committee on Renaissance Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies. (First series [1945]). To be obtained through Professor Leicester Bradner, Brown University, Providence, R.I. Offprints, bound in a single volume, with paging of original sources.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Contents, with references to sources: (1) Louis B. Wright, "Introduction to a survey of Renaissance studies," *Modern language quarterly*, II (1941), 355-

This collection of essays previously published in various journals is of outstanding usefulness in that it presents not only valuable bibliographies in each of the particular fields of study dealt with but scholarly evaluations of the status of research up to 1941, in musicology up to 1944. Thus it is a remarkable contribution to both the history and the present-day problems of Renaissance research.

In his introduction, Louis B. Wright, of the Huntington Library, emphasizes the particular importance ascribed to Renaissance studies today because of the genesis of modern ways of life, for which western European civilization was supposedly conditioned by the break with the past, beginning in the fifteenth century. In view of the particular problem which the transformation of civilization in the Renaissance period presents, Wright calls for a more comprehensive understanding of the interrelationship of the various cultural phenomena and likewise for a greater detachment on the part of the scholar from the point of view of our own age. To contribute to these ends, the surveys attempt "to discover the main trends of research, to ascertain the state

62. (2) Francis R. Johnson and Sanford V. Larkey, "Science," *Modern language quarterly*, II (1941), 363-401. (3) Don Cameron Allen, "Latin literature," *Modern language quarterly*, II (1941), 403-20. (4) John G. Kunstmann, "German literature," *Modern language quarterly*, II (1941), 421-38. (5) Samuel F. Will, "French literature," *Modern language quarterly*, II, (1941), 439-64. (6) Rosemund Tuve, "A critical survey of scholarship in the field of English literature of the Renaissance," *Studies in philology*, XL (1943), 294-55. (7) Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall, Jr., "The study of the philosophies of the Renaissance," *Journal of the history of ideas*, II (1941), 449-96. (8) F. L. Nussbaum, "The economic history of Renaissance Europe: problems and solutions during the past generation," *Journal of modern history*, XIII (1941), 527-45. (9) Felix Gilbert, "Political thought of the Renaissance and Reformation: a report on recent scholarship," *Huntington Library quarterly*, IV (1941), 443-68. (10) Raphael M. Huber, "Recent important literature regarding the Catholic church during the late Renaissance period, 1500-1648," *Church history*, X, No. 1 (March, 1941), 3-37. (11) Wilhelm Pauck, "The historiography of the German Reformation during the past twenty years," *Church history*, IX, No. 4 (December, 1940), 3-38. (12) Dean P. Lockwood and Roland H. Bainton, "Classical and biblical scholarship in the age of the Renaissance and Reformation," *Church history*, X, No. 2 (June, 1941), 3-21. (13) Carleton Sprague Smith and William Dinneen, "Recent work on music in the Renaissance," *Modern philology*, XLII (1944), 41-58.

of our knowledge in the major fields of interest, and to learn what fields are well explored and which ones most need investigation" (Introd., p. 358). For practical purposes the term "Renaissance" is used to cover all the elements of change taking place in western Europe from the middle of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth.

The goal set by the committee has been fully attained. The survey on philosophy, for instance, written by Paul O. Kristeller and John H. Randall, reviews in its first part the history of the studies in Renaissance philosophy from the later nineteenth century onward; then—by adding brief critical comments on each group of bibliographical data—gives an extensive survey of the materials available for Renaissance studies; and, finally, concludes the survey with a third part, which is devoted to a discussion of the needs emerging from this comprehensive analysis of the present status of studies in Renaissance philosophy. The authors stress the necessity of increasing the number of texts available in modern critical editions and the need for a reinterpretation of many writings from the texts. They illustrate this suggestion by numerous examples. Other contributors to the surveys, also, make valuable suggestions for further research. Thus John G. Kunstmann concludes his survey on German Renaissance literature with a list of desiderata; Wilhelm Pauck calls for more attention to Protestant sectarianism; and Dean P. Lockwood and Roland H. Bainton describe the primary need in the field of classical and biblical scholarship in the age of the Renaissance and Reformation as "a comprehensive work covering all aspects of the subject." Felix Gilbert concludes his masterly analysis of recent scholarship on the political theory of the Renaissance and Reformation with the well-justified suggestion that future studies in this field should seek their unity in "the broadest possible historical context." These examples may suffice to indicate the wealth of critical and suggestive thought which the volume contains beyond its bibliographical data, indispensable to any Renaissance scholar.

It is to be hoped that the committee will

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succeed in continuing these surveys. A second series might bring up to date the fields already covered and might include other important fields according to the promise made in the preface of the present volume. They should include art and artistic theory, historiography, law, political history, and the history of discoveries and colonization. It might be in line with the general purpose of the undertaking, as Mr. Wright has stated it, if a comprehensive review of the existing synoptic studies of the period were added. Likewise it might prove valuable to include separate surveys of the scholarly work dealing with the problems of "the beginning" and "the end" of the Renaissance, that is, with the relations between Renaissance and Middle Ages and between Renaissance and Baroque. The enterprise of the Committee on Renaissance Studies promises to result in a valuable co-ordination of Renaissance studies, which, at the same time, leaves complete freedom to the individual scholar.

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*Modern German literature: 1870-1940.* By VICTOR LANGE. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1945. Pp. xiv+223.

This introductory essay, written in a fluid and versatile style, is addressed to the general public rather than to the scholar. Termed by the author himself "a critical outline of German literature between 1870 and the present," it gives a survey rather than an analysis, intended to satisfy primarily the interests of those "who do not read the originals with ease." A valuable bibliography (pp. 141-206) comes to their aid and supplements the work of Bayard Quincy Morgan.<sup>1</sup> Introducing the American reader to the production of the last three generations of German letters is a much needed effort, which, however, could hardly satisfy every expectation in the narrow space of 130 pages. Therefore the author is justified

in expecting that no undue demands be made upon his book.

Lange conceives criticism not merely as a technical matter but as involving the obligation to arrive at judgments going beyond the aesthetic value of literary works. This is the more difficult as German literature in the later nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was bound to respond to the profound transformation of the traditional patterns of living and to the corresponding corrosion of metaphysical and ethical standards. The Germans experienced both in a development more sudden and catastrophic than that of the other Western nations. Because of the complexity of his problem the author approaches his subject by a combination of social analysis with a critical judgment of literary form and of the philosophic bases of literary production. It must be regretted that the encyclopedic character of his essay prevents him from demonstrating the usefulness of this approach by intensive analysis and proof. Aware of the mission of the man of letters in shaping the conceptions of life through the mirror of his work, Lange has widened his range of consideration beyond the boundaries of literature proper into the fields of philosophy and historical consciousness. He views recent German literature as a literature of crisis. He facilitates its understanding by explaining its leading works as emerging from a full awareness of this critical situation on the part of the writers. When he considers his subject within the wider scope of European and, to some extent, even of American letters, he complies with a requirement inherent in German literature, which was open to international literary intercourse and which was dominated by a universal rather than a provincial concern. To a great extent, also, the problems of its recent past are not confined to the Germans alone but are common to the Western world.

The author is aware of the breadth of questions raised by this varied body of literary production. But the compulsion to deal succinctly with these most complex phenomena forms a serious obstacle to his critical purpose. Hemmed into a narrow space, the author has no real chance of developing his method and

<sup>1</sup> A critical bibliography of German literature in English translation, 1481-1927, with supplement embracing the years 1928-1935 (2d ed.; Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1938).

insight. Therefore his critical judgments are sometimes shortened to an extent which makes it difficult to ascertain his argument. For the same reason he is prevented from giving convincing evidence of his attempt to group divergent, yet simultaneous, literary tendencies according to both their philosophical foundations and their chronological sequence.

The author opens his survey by reviewing the perspectives which the nineteenth-century bourgeois world offered for the later development of German literature. He stresses the survival of an insular provincialism in the midst of the rise of modern capitalistic organization and the antagonism between the tenets of the naturalistic novel and drama and Richard Wagner's idea of the *Gesamtkunstwerk*. The emergence of a renewed impulse toward pure art with the revision of the conception of poetry by Hofmannsthal, Rilke, and George he interprets as a movement of "Anti-Alexanders," in the sense of Nietzsche's remark that our task today is that of gaining "the supreme strength for gathering up, binding together and joining the individual threads of the fabric so as to prevent their being scattered to the four winds." The sense of crisis growing since the turn of the century Lange emphasizes in a chapter termed "Irony and resolution." Here he treats authors such as Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Carl Spitteler, and Paul Ernst. He stresses the dissatisfaction which, in the years before 1914, expanded with regard to "impressionist delicacy and naturalistic determinism."

The second half of the book presents "the successive stages of a thirty years' revolution in which each decade develops its own pattern of outward action and spiritual coherence" (p. 79). This organization of the essay brings up the question of whether it is really possible to establish a chronological pattern of presentation rather than a parallelism of basic groups of literary action and philosophy emerging from the situation of "Coherence gone," which existed even in the later Wilhelmian period and is related to the formation of antagonistic groups and their increased importance throughout the last thirty years. In fact, Lange often

recurs to these different schools of thought whose resilience grew even stronger under the impact of changing circumstances in these three decades. Attempts at a recovery of the emotional equilibrium the author recognizes in the "magic realism" of *Neue Sachlichkeit* and also in the recourse to searching for "a new firmness of purpose and a new sense of inner stability" in the recollection of the recent and the far distant past. The diversity of these efforts becomes evident from the treatment under this same point of view of work of so different a fiber as that of Hermann Hesse and Ernst Junger, Carl Zuckmayer and Erwin Guido Kolbenheyer. The effect that the Nazi decade had upon German literature may remain, for some time, beyond the possibilities of the critic to discern. Lange at least asks the fruitful question as to what strength of survival "The threatened heritage" may have shown under the strain of totalitarianism and the impact of war. In this survey he includes both the Nazi writers and the "inner" and outer emigration from Germany.

Ultimately, the basis of Lange's judgment is an ethical conception of the responsibility of the poet for "evoking and sustaining the permanent signs of human virtue and resolution." He postulates a criticism conceived as a "mode of action" and considers the critic a responsible element in the growth or rebirth of standards and their application to our judgment of literary phenomena. These principles of literary interpretation deserve consideration, although Lange has not succeeded in imparting their thorough effect to his essay. The difficulty which it provides to the reader is connected with its characterization of individual authors and works rather than with its way of stating the problems and of approaching them. These characterizations vary, for instance, from a clearly designed picture of Hermann Hesse's career and personality to a rather pale and conventional sketch of Hans Carossa, which, in consequence, remains unimpressive. A hardly tenable presentation of Spengler's historical determinism as a "belated materialistic document" stands in contrast with a well-balanced judgment of Nietzsche

and his "catalytic" function in the process of German thought. The essay is neither more nor less than what it promises to be, namely, an outline. It introduces to the American reader many an author who ought not to remain the exclusive property of the scholar. The value of the book should be sought in its suggestions.

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*Sainte-Beuve aux États-Unis.* By ROBERT G. MAHIEU. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945. Pp. xii+162+[10].

Sainte-Beuve's "portraits" and critical essays began to be translated for American readers as early as 1868, within the lifetime of their author; and in the seventy-five years which have elapsed since his death other translations have appeared, together with numerous appreciations, scholarly studies, and editions for schools. His approach to the problems of criticism has attracted American essayists, and his method has presumably been emulated by American critics. To survey this material, tracing the fortune of the "prince of critics" in the United States and assessing his influence on American critical thought, is the object of Mahieu's monograph.

A preliminary chapter outlines Sainte-Beuve's personal contacts with Americans and his knowledge of American life and letters.<sup>1</sup> This is followed by a rather unsatisfactory chapter on translations and a long chapter (occupying nearly half of the book) entitled "La Fortune de Sainte-Beuve," analyzing the different aspects of the Frenchman's reputation—as poet, novelist, critic, author of *Port-Royal*, etc.—in America. The remainder of the book consists of two chapters concerning his influence, first, upon the "Humanists" (chiefly Irving Babbitt), and then in the writings of such diverse figures as Brownell, Gamaliel Bradford, and Huneker; a chapter on foreign intermediaries (such as Arnold and Gosse),

whose prestige helped to further the reception of Sainte-Beuve's work in this country; and a brief conclusion. Supplementary items include an appendix noting the attention paid to Sainte-Beuve in schools (translations, selections, texts, comments in manuals, etc.), a bibliography divided between books and magazine articles, and a novel and interesting "Iconographie de Sainte-Beuve."

The difficulties of dealing adequately with such a subject are considerable, partly because of the voluminous material to be covered, particularly in periodicals; and Mahieu's industry in searching the files of American magazines will be appreciated by every user of his book. An analytical index of references to Sainte-Beuve in American books and periodicals, if done completely and accurately, would be a work of obvious usefulness, whether in the form of running commentary (as in Eric Partridge's *The French Romantics' knowledge of English literature* [Paris, 1924]) or classified bibliography (as in D. H. Stevens' *Reference guide to Milton* [Chicago, 1930]). Mahieu's work, however, in spite of its brevity, is planned on more ambitious lines: it not merely offers an index to the fortune of Sainte-Beuve in America but seeks to interpret the influence of the French critic on American thought. Such an investigation involves questions which are not easily answered. How widely, for instance, were Sainte-Beuve's works read in the original (such as *Volupé* or *Joseph Delorme*), in comparison with the *Causeries du lundi*, which were translated early and frequently? Was Sainte-Beuve's reputation as great among the general cultivated American public as it was in the schools and colleges? How many of the opinions quoted reflect firsthand American views, in an age when English books were freely pirated and when such journals flourished as the *Living age* and the *Eclectic*? Not all these questions receive satisfactory answers in Mahieu's book; some of them would seem to be unanswerable until further bibliographical research has been done. A bibliography of translations from the French which were published in this country is still a desideratum. Mahieu's second chapter

<sup>1</sup> This may be supplemented by Lander MacClintock's article, "Sainte-Beuve and America," *PMLA*, LX (1945), 427-36, which shows how meager was Sainte-Beuve's knowledge of the United States.

("Traductions") does not give a clear and orderly account of the translations of Sainte-Beuve published in the English language.<sup>2</sup>

The influence of Sainte-Beuve in America was obstructed, Mahieu believes, partly by the great reputation of Goethe, partly by the Germanic "orientation" of American universities in the nineteenth century, and partly by the American—or rather Anglo-Saxon—tendency to project questions of morality into discussions of works of art. He is able to show a considerable awareness of the greatness of Sainte-Beuve in the seventies and eighties, an increasing number of scholarly studies between 1909 and 1931, and a definite "establishing" of the French critic's reputation in the thirties, in connection with the rise of the Humanist movement.

Mahieu's survey is less clear and easy to follow than the above summary would suggest. The weaving of English quotations into the French text creates a certain effect of disorder, an effect which is increased when the quotations are chosen without too careful consideration for chronology or for relative importance. One example out of many may be noted on page 73 (from chap. iv, "Humanisme contre

<sup>2</sup> It would be desirable, of course, to have not only a chronological list of translations but also an indication of the libraries in which copies may be found and information as to the popularity of the several translations. The *Monday-chats*, for instance, as translated by William Mathews, would seem to be one of the more popular. The University of Chicago Library has the first edition of 1877 (which Mahieu says was reviewed in the *Unitarian review* of 1870), the fourth edition (1882), and also an edition of 1891. The selected *Essays*, translated by Elizabeth Lee (London, n.d.), which Mahieu places at the end of his discussion (p. 23), appeared as early as 1892. The *Essays on men and women*, translated by William Sharpe, appeared in London in 1890 and in Chicago in 1891. The *Select essays, chiefly bearing on English literature*, translated by A. J. Butler, were published in London in 1895. In a record of the translations it would seem important, too, to distinguish between purely American enterprises (such as the *Monday-chats* of William Mathews) and those which were first, or simultaneously, published in Great Britain (such as the translations by Katharine Wormsley in 1904 and 1905). Finally, it would be of interest to know at how early a date portions of Sainte-Beuve's work were available to American readers in translation. I note a selection as early as 1848 in the *Literary American* of G. P. Quackenbos ("Incidents in the early life of Chateaubriand, translated from the French of Sainte Beuve," *Literary American*, October 7, 1848, p. 217).

dynamisme"), where the discussion shifts abruptly from the Concord post-transcendentalists in the period after the Civil War to a statement quoted out of context from a periodical of 1932 ("The new humanists are the most earnest students and stalwart champions of Sainte-Beuve today") and then back to a discussion of the early days of Babbitt and More and the beginnings of Humanism. Of equal importance is a consideration of the nature of the testimony cited; when the opinions of scholars, journalists, popular essayists, and first-rate critics are mingled, it is difficult to reach clear and reasoned conclusions. The longest chapter in the book, on "La Fortune de Sainte-Beuve," contains a wealth of material and makes very interesting reading, but it is marred by this disregard for chronology and proportion. A discussion of the influence of Sainte-Beuve on James Russell Lowell, for instance, intrudes into the recounting of Sainte-Beuve's fortune before 1869 (pp. 26-27); a long quotation from Sarah Wister on Sainte-Beuve's method is to be found (pp. 31-32) in the section headed "L'Homme"; and we descend to the trivial on page 43, when a substantial paragraph from W. F. Giese on Sainte-Beuve's art as a novelist is followed by the information, in a paragraph of almost equal length, that a twentieth-century reviewer was reminded of *Volupté* when he read G. A. Borgese's novel, *Rubè*.<sup>3</sup>

Mahieu's book, it will be seen, contains a great deal of important and valuable material. He has read so widely in both primary and secondary sources and has such a sympathetic interest in Sainte-Beuve that he is admirably equipped to give us a longer and definitive study. The most interesting problem in such a study would surely be that of Sainte-Beuve's critical method, a question which receives brief treatment (pp. 58-59) in a subsection of chapter iii in the present work. As a matter of fact,

<sup>3</sup> A few inaccuracies in quotations may be noted: p. 32, l. 10: *read acts and sayings*; p. 49, ll. 8-12: these sentences which purport to be by George H. Calvert, are really by Sainte-Beuve himself; p. 52, l. 12 from bottom: *for biographies read biography*; the last sentence on this page, from William Mathews, cuts off the main clause and destroys the meaning; p. 116, ll. 29-30: *read our own ablest critics*.

Sainte-Beuve's method received a detailed and searching analysis very early, in the introduction to William Mathews' translation of *Monday-chats* (Chicago, 1877), which Mahieu notes as "la première étude d'ensemble sur Sainte-Beuve" (p. 19). Though Mathews was not an important critic, his career as journalist, writer of *Getting on in the world* and other best-sellers, and teacher—he was for over a decade professor of rhetoric and English in the old University of Chicago—is of some importance in the development of middle western culture.

What right [Mathews inquires] have we, in estimating a book, to go beyond the book itself,—to travel "out of the record," and to consider the character of the writer,—still more that of his parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins? Are we obliged to find melodious versification in John Smith's poem, because his sisters sang like nightingales; or wit in Peter Snooks's comedy, because he had a witty sister? . . . What matters it, if a book charms, inspires, or instructs us, whether the author smoked or drank stimulants; or borrowed money, or forgot to pay his tailor and his washerwoman? . . . To know all these petty details is pleasant, and gratifies a natural curiosity; they give picturesqueness and charm to biography; they may help occasionally to explain the growth and prominence of some idiosyncrasy, or some characteristic sentiment or idea; but how a knowledge of them is necessary to a just estimate of the literary productions of these authors, it is hard to see. In choosing a public officer, a man to fill a responsible position, it is right to demand guarantees of character; but what has Art to do with guarantees? Every work is its own warranty; it carries with it its *raison d'être* in its very qualities. The natural order, it seems to us, is to try a man by his works, and not the works by the man; and for such a trial the best qualification is a naturally delicate taste, improved by the study of the best models, a knowledge of the fixed canons of judgment that have stood the test of time, and a judicial impartiality [pp. lviii–lx].

This is a fair sample of Mathews' style, and his work deserves emphasis as an early and important American reaction to Sainte-Beuve's method in criticism. Aside from its rhetoric, however, and its plentiful illustrations from English literature, it represents a wholesale pillaging from C.-A. *Sainte-Beuve*,

*sa vie et ses œuvres* of the Vicomte d'Haussonville, published in Paris two years earlier, a work which Mahieu twice mentions but which he does not seem to know as the source of Mathews' ideas. Mathews' long essay, nevertheless, because of its readability and its evident popularity constitutes an important document in the history of the fortunes and influence of Sainte-Beuve in the United States.

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*England and the Mediterranean tradition: studies in art, history, and literature.* Edited by the WARBURG and COURTAULD INSTITUTES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON. London: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. 232.

This collection of essays from the Warburg and Courtauld *Journal* will be welcomed by all regular readers of that distinguished publication, but it should also reach a wider audience. It offers fascinating reading to everyone who wishes to follow the contemporary interest in the history of ideas, since it is well known that ideas scorn the academic boundaries of subject matter and leap gaily from politics to art, from philosophy to literature. The writers represented in this volume have traced for us with sound scholarship and entertaining style some of these jumps. Three examples may suffice to indicate the range of material. Wind shows us how the political writings of the Restoration period brought about the allegorical use of the figure of Julian the Apostate in the paintings in Hampton Court palace; Yates brings to light a very interesting connection between sixteenth-century emblems, the philosophy of Giordano Bruno, and the poetry of Sidney; Jamison proves that the political relations between England and Sicily influenced the choice of figures in church decoration in the latter kingdom during the twelfth century.

The field covered by the book is correctly indicated by the title. The various contributions deal with the use of ancient, classical, or medieval and Renaissance Italian sources by English artists and writers. The only exception

is the interesting case of reverse influence found in Jamison's essay. Typical examples are Gordon's examination of Jonson's use of sixteenth-century Italian mythologies in his masques and Pächt's "A Giottesque episode in English medieval art." The whole volume illustrates the constant interrelations between national cultures in the history of Europe.

In such a profusion of riches it is difficult to select individual essays for special praise, and perhaps it is invidious to do so. Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from mentioning, in addition to

those cited above, Saxl's investigation of the figures on the Ruthwell Cross, Mitchell's history of the tradition of realistic history-painting behind West's "Death of General Wolfe," and Clark's stimulating survey of the development of landscape gardening in the eighteenth century.

Finally, in view of the subject matter, it is not irrelevant to add that the book is profusely illustrated.

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